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ABSTRACT
This study deals with the cross-linguistic
interpretation of aspect and tense in natural languages
which have superficially disparate morphological structure.
It is argued that in Yao, Chea (Bantu languages) and
English, where aspect for instance, is not as systematically
grarnmaticalized as it is in Slavic, the interpretation of
aspect and tense must be one which construes them as
theoretical (conceptual) categories. We assume essentially
that both aspect and tense are characterized by temporal
primitives which are often though riot invariably, denoted
by morphological markers.
"Verbal aspect" in Slavic for example, is effectively
defined by the temporal stretch encoded in (or signalled by)
a productive system of afuixal marking. The temporal stretch
is characteristically completive, inceptive, resumptive,
durative, continuative, punctual, iterative etc. These
aspectua]. time schemata have affinities with those assumed
by philosophers and linguists like Vendler (1957), Kenny
(1963), Dowty (1977, 1979) and others for the classification
of verbs and verb phrases. These in turn are similar to the
time schemata encoded by such categories as adverbials and
noun phrases. Accordingly, though Yao, Chea and English
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might not mark aspect morphologically in the manner common
in Slavic, the specification of aspect is assured by the
semantic content of VPs, ADVs etc., thus facilitating a
cross-linguistic treatment of the category.
Correspondingly, "tense", which is a deictic category
and is largely morphologized in Yao and Chea is also best
understood when we examine the temporal structure of whole
utterances. We take tense to be a category orthogonal to
aspectual concepts like continuity, habituality, inception,
completion etc. and which specifies how these are related
to each other, in terms of whether or not they are anterior
or posterior to or simultaneous with the speech time of
utterances in question (Cf. Reichenbach, 19147; and followers).
Traditional and model-theoretic treatments of these
concepts have inadequacies which manifest themselves in the
form of such problems as the "imperfective paradOx"
(Cf. Dowty, ibid), the "gaps problem" (Cf. Bennett, 1981),
the problem of the lack of difference in truth conditions
between the "simple past" and "perfect" utterances when it
is clear that some (intuitively semantic) difference between
them exists etc. It is suggested that these issues be
resolved within pregmatics of the Gricean (1968, 1975 etc)
type as recently extended by Sperber & Wilson (1982,
forthcoming).
On the interpretation of aspect and tense in Yao,
Che'a and English then, this study takes the view that two
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factors are operative: semantic factors exemplified by the
knowledge (or identification) of the time schemata encoded
in morphological markers, words and constructions and the
truth-conditional processing of the propositions thus
expressed on the one hand, and pragmatic factors of their
use (e.g. the "principle of relevance" of Sperber &
Wilson, ibid.) which determine the choice of the appropriate
construal of those utterances which are especially temporally
indeterminate on the other.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTI ON
This study concerns the interpretation of aspect
and tense in Yao, Chea and English. The treatment of
these categories across Yao, Chea 2 (or the so-called
"Bantu languages" generally) on the one hand and English
on the other, is at first sight beset by several problems.
The fact that the three languages have disparate
morphological structure and that aspect, for instance,
is a grammatical category which is characteristic of
Slavonic languages and not Bantu, are two problems
pertinent to the issue. We discuss these problems in
the next chapter. But perhaps more immediate than these
is the absence of established "typological" parameters
expected to be adopted for any such cross-linguistic
treatment.
Comrie (1976) is the natural place where we might
expect such "typological parameters" for the contrastive
treatment of aspect especially, to be indicated. But
Comrie is too wise to want to attempt a move which might
lead to an impasse. A recent study by Dezs8 (1982) devoted
to constrastive syntactic typology for Russian, Hungarian
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and other languages such as Swahili and Yao etc., typifies
the confusion for any expected typological treatment of
these categories. Discussing the basic sentence structure
for determining "word order" in the languages indicated,
for instance, Dezs8 (p.22) makes a digression to discuss
the uncertain role of the typology of aspect and tense thus:
The features of aspect and tense are much
more problematic. The three basic tenses
(past, present, future) are perhaps universal,
or almost universal, whereas aspect or
aspectuality is a type phenomenon with non-
universal features. Unfortunately, the
typological research into the categories of
tense and aspect is still in its rudimentary
stage.
In this study we hold the view that such typological
research will remain rudimentary if we insist on the
identification of aspect and tense with largely morphological
parameters for their cross-linguistic treatment.
The claim of this thesis is that what might be referred
to as the traditional "typological" treatment of aspect and
tense would be appropriate where the languages in question
have as it were, similar morphological structure (e.g.
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Bantu languages or Slavonic languages) and consensus is
reached on the so-called typological parameters. Otherwise,
as in our case here, the morphological parameters particularly
for the treatment of aspect across Yao, Chea and English
are largely non-existent and at any rate in part, irrelevant.
Obviously where aspectual concepts are morphologized in
the three languages, the important role of aspectual marking
will not be dismissed. We believe however, that it is the
semantic content of verb phrases, adverbials, the
morphological markers themselves and other items (from which
utterances are constructed) and especially the semantic
content of whole utterances in both linguistic and extra-
linguistic contexts, that facilitates the interpretation of
these categories across languages. In other words, we
acknowledge that the morpho-syntactic level plays an
important role in the interpretation of aspect and tense.
We assume however, that this is the first stage in the
treatment of the two categories. Two other stages concern
first, the interpretation of these categories insofar as
their temporal structures are reflected in the semantics of
whole utterances (and/or their treatment truth-conditionally);
and the second stage concerns the interpretation of the
categories contextually - constituting what might be called
their pragmatics.
On the interpretation of tense which is largely
inorphologized in Yao and Che*a however, we shall follow
-1 L_
the advice of one wise linguist and claim that it is
perverse to minimize the importance (in our case) of
a good morpho-syntactic and semantic treatment of tense
at our disposal in favour of a weak or an anecdotal
theory of pragmatics or cognition. And if we adopt a
pragmatic programme of the Gricean (1968, 1975 etc.)
kind as extended by Sperber & Wilson (1982, and
forthcoming), as we do below it is because the other
two levels have been looked at and proven inadequate
in ways which this study will make clear; and because
we believe this partly cognitive based pragmatic theory
not to be grounded in anecdote.
This thesis is organised along the following lines.
Chapter two explores the parameters for the interpretation
of mainly aspect and probably any other "covert" grammatical
category which might be said not to "exist" overtly in some
language or group of languages, and we conclude on the note
that where aspect for example, is not morphologized, the
concepts which are denoted by morphological markers in one
language might be lexicalized or otherwise encoded in whole
utterances in another.
Chapter three illustrates the claims of chapter two.
It demonstrates how the concepts which characterize aspect
are lexicalized and expressed in certain cases, sententially.
We exploit the now well known Aristotle-Ryle-Vendler-.Kenny
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classification of verbs and verb phrases to demonstrate
how aspectual concepts are "universally" encoded in
natural languages.
Chapter four elaborates these claims for tense,
essentially showing how this category is largely morpho-
logized in Yao, Chea and English. After sketching some
of the limitations of this traditional approach, we adopt
an extended version of the Reichenbachian (1947) treatment
of tense. This framework partly fails to account for the
interpretation of vague utterances. We note also that the
Reichenbachian approach vacillates between the semantic
and the pragmatic treatment of this category; without
clearly indicating which role is played by semantics and
which by pragmatics.
Even model-theoretic, truth-conditional and possible
worlds treatments of aspect and tense are in part inadequate.
Chapter five thus indicates informally how the truth
conditions formalized by Dowty (1977, 1979), Bennett (1981),
Viach (1981) and others, and proposed in part f or the
interpretation of particularly vague or temporally
indeterminate utterances, attempt and largely fail to
incorporate pragmatic factors. Finally, chapter six
indicates what type of pragmatic theory might be adopted
for the interpretation of these vague utterances. We
argue for the adoption of the Gricean type of pragmatics;
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not in its state as formalized by Gazdar (1979) and
others, but in its extended form as presented by Sperber &
Wilson (ibid.) to account for the appropriate assignment
of reference for vague or indeterminate utterances
generally.
Linguistic studies tend to be ephemeral these days.
And with the proliferation of theories of aspect and
tense that one finds in the literature, it is difficult
to claim that the solutions proposed for the inter-
pretation of aspect and tense here, are even conclusive.
Perhaps the only lasting contribution that this thesis
will have made may be that of speculating with illustrative
data from Yao, Chea and English that aspect and tense
are categories which are morphologically marked in some
languages and lexicalized in others ( and both in yet
others); and that in either case, a better picture for the
interpretation of aspect and tense emerges only when they
are treated sententially ( covertly).
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE
1.	 Although these two languages are generally referred
to as ChiYao and ChiChe'a, i.e. with their initial class
prefix, we shall follow Whiteley (1966), Watkins (1937) and
others who simply refer to them as Yao and Che*a respectively.
Often we shall take Y, C and E to stand for these two
languages and English throughout this study, keeping that
order unless otherwise stated.
	
2,	 The term Chea as used by Watkins (1937) referred to
the Central Nalai dialect of what used to be known as
ChiNyanja (or simply Nyanja), a Central African language
whose Southern Mala ri dialect (exemplified by the sentences
in this study), was standard in Mala'i, Zambia and
Mozambique. In ala'i however, Nyanja is now referred to
as Chea (the decision was largely political), though It
retains the old name in Zambia and Mozambique. Yao is
spoken by roughly one and half million people and Cheta/
Nyanja by roughly six million people (these largely
conservative figures refer to speakers in the whole region).
The majority of the Yao and Chea/Nyanja speakers however,
live in Malai.
	
3.	 For a typical Bantu sentence structure the Yao and
Chea treatments by Thiteley, 1966; and Watkins, 1937,
are sufficient. Generally (a) below:
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(a)	 S-.-NP VP
ii VP-V NP
iii	 V-p + alt + (a/t) + Cop) + yr + (a/ve
is sufficient to indicate the structure of a typical Bantu
sentence. What we will be concerned with in this study is
(a) • In (a)	
,	
stands for subject prefix, a/t
for aspect or tense marker, 	 for object prefix, yr for
the verb root (or radical), a/ye for aspectual or verb
extension markers. A typical Yao example might be (b).
(b) Wjâb a + ki + sà + ch'I + ly + g
	
chijtin?
NP sp a/t a/t op.	 yr	 a	 NP
he cont,hab. it eat iter. bird
(Wajabu eats bird)
Notice that	 and	 generally copy features of the
subject and object NPs respectively, i.e. reflecting the
class and number of the NPs in the process •	The cont.,
hab. and Iter. stand for "continuous, habitual and
iterative" markers respectively. In other words, (b) is
best interpreted as: It is Wajabu's habit (it is
characteristic of him) to eat birds.
As for the tones, we assume that there are four
"basic" tones: low, high, low-high and high-low. The
knowledge of these is sufficient not only for uttering
the sentences or words, but also for the purposes of
disambiguatiori or the appropriate assignment of meaning.
-19-
CHAPTER TWO
ON MARKING, INTERPRETING AND UNDERSTANDING
ASPECT (AND TENSE) ACROSS LANGUAGE
"The lexical entry for a concept provides the
information necessary for coding it into natural
language .. it can differ through time or across
speakers without altering the concept itself:
for example, an English and a French speaker
may share the concept cat, while attaching
different lexical entries to it, one coding it
into English and the other into French; in the
case of a bilingual speaker there will be more
than one lexical entry per concept."
Sperber & Wilson (MS:14...15),
Language and Relevarice:Foundations of Praginatic Theory.
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2.0 Introduction
In this chapter we present a theoretical overview
aimed at clarifying the nature of aspect (and to some
extent tense) in the interpretation of utterances in
natural languages. We start by making a claim which is
obvious from the literature, that the proper treatment of
aspect and tense across languages with superficially
disparate morphological structure (as Yao and Che*a on
the one hand and English on the other clearly are),
must be one which construes aspect (and tense) as
theoretical (conceptual) categories. In the first section,
we assume simply that while some languages grammaticalize
aspect or mark it morpho-phonologically others lexicalize
it. We argue that in either case, a fuller understanding
of how we interpret aspect (and tense) in utterances is
provided when we treat them at a level which is neutral
to surface differences between languages, e.g. at the
propositional (conceptual) level.
Taking this line does not however, exclude the fact
that in Slavic aspect is systematically morphologically
marked. We take up the issue of aspectual marking and
inarkedness generally in the second section where we
indicate that we not only dontt have an appropriate
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theory of rnarkedness which is applicable for inter -
pretatiori of aspect and tense at the conceptual level,
but that conceiving of aspect and tense at this level
necessitates our taking markedness generally less seriously.
We conclude this section by indicating that aspectual and
tense marking is taken merely as a term which is
conveniently used to describe default choice of an
element in a given system: morpho-phonological, syntactic,
and semantic. And in the interpretation of aspect and
tense what is important is not necessarily the markedness
per Se, but knowledge of "default" meanings (Cf. Smith N.V
1981) and "conventional" as well as "conversational"
implicatures (Cf. Grice, 1968, 1975 etc.) that aspectual
and tense markers (as well as lexical items) have in the
utterances they appear.
The last section of the chapter looks at one or two
definitons of aspect which corroborate the position we
hold about how it ought to be treated as a theoretical
primitive across language. It is the definition which
takes time as the main defining feature of aspect that we
find most illuminating. Friedrich's (1974) definition is
especially useful because it sees aspect as the duration
or punctuality (or the time stretch, long or short) which
inheres in "words" and "constructions". This indicates that
to understand aspect we must go beyond the words sometimes
and see how the time is encoded in utterances: the scene for
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the semantic and the pragmatic interpretation of aspect
(and tense) is set.
2.1	 A Grammatical Category Across Language
A cross-linguistic treatment of the category
"aspect" in Yao, Che*a and English naturally raises
several age-old questions of both theoretical and
empirical kind. We should like to address ourselves
to one or two of these briefly and informally here.
First then, we note the rather obvious fact that Yao
and Chea belong to the Bantu group of agglutinative
languages of Africa which have little superficially in
common with English except perhaps that the three
languages share the property of having SVO as their
word order. Second, and following from this, comparison
of a grammatical category like aspect across languages
of such disparate morphological structure might therefore
be considered to be an unproductive enterprise. This is
especially so because aspect is traditionally claimed to
be a phenomenon which has had its origins in and developed
largely for some Indo-European, particularly Slavonic,
languages i.e. aspect, by and large, is sometimes considered
to be non-existent in English and Bantu languages. The
question that needs immediate answer is therefore this:
where category X in language L1 is not overtly i.e.
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morphologically, marked as it is in language L2 , in what
form does this category exist in L1 if its existence is
still to be defended in that language?
How we propose to answer this question can be
demonstrated by a brief illustrative digression. The task
we are engaged in is reminiscent of the current linguistic
controversy concerning other grammatical categories. The
controversy concerning the status of the"auxiliary" (AUX)
category in natural language immediately comes to mind.
The issues themselves are complicated and in attempting
to isolate the salient features of the controversy here,
we do not intend to trivialize them. But the antagonists
in the AUX category controversy, as represented for example
by Pullum (1981) and Kalsse (1981) on the one hand, have
effectively been arguing inter alia, against our taking
for granted as a given language universal such a
traditionally assumed category as the AUX without
seriously challenging its very existence in natural
language. On the other side are Akmajian et al. (1979)
and Steele et al. (1981) who insist by shuffling the
morphological, syntactic and semantic structure of
several languages that AUX is indeed a universal category
which, according to them, must be treated within Universal
Grammar: indeed, this category is tacitly used to
exemplify the existence of Universal Grammar itself. And
the battle threatens to rage on with the two camps so
polarized that they appear almost mutually uncomprehending.
The moral of this digression is what we take to
be the central position adopted throughout this essay:
that is, we assume that however clearly marked (e.g.
morphologically) categories like aspect and tense might
be in one language, and however unmarked they might be in
other languages, generally speaking, natural language has
other means of building in or expressing the "concepts"
underlying such categories. This is in line with the
central message implicit in the epigraph at the top of
this chapter. When we lament the absence of the treatment
of aspect in the pedagogical grammars of Bantu (C.I.
footnote I below) then we are rejecting the claim implicit
in the traditional literature that Bantu fails to express
the concepts inherent in this category i.e. we accept
'effability'. But let us briefly indicate what these
traditional claims are.
A careful study of the literature on aspect
indicates that there is one uncompromising line adopted
by some Slavonic linguists about how Slavonic aspect is.
Zandvoort (1962) is one of them, as is witnessed by his
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own words recently quoted by Bache (1982: 57-58):
The plain statement 'Aspect Is a conception
which does not exist in English Grammar' may
be hard to digest for some linguists who
refuse to take the character of aspect in
Slavonic as an absolute standard. But
what is the use, also from the standpoint
of general linguistics, of a term which in
the Germanic languages 'means something
entirely different from what it means in
the Slavonic languages'...?
For one wanting to describe and interpret aspect across
language, the situation appears hopeless then, given
this hardline position.
This position is reminiscent of another line of
thought propagated by the Ugandan theologian, Mbiti (1969)
about tense and the expression of time in East African
languages. ITbiti claims that Africans from East Africa
and speaking Kikamba or Gikuyu have virtually no concept
of the distant future because there are "no concrete words
or expressions to convey the idea of a distant future"
(p.17) and he invokes an elaborate Kikamba and Gikuyu
main verb tense system to illustrate his point (Cf. MbitI,
1969: table at p.18)
-26-
Nbiti is obviously one of those theologians who
never grow beyond their Whorfian position in their
thinking about human cultures. But as Gillies (1980)
and others (Cf. Ricoeur, ed. 1976) have clearly indicated,
there must be something seriously amiss about the accuracy
of Mbiti's theology, let alone, metaphysics. For a
language not to possess concrete words or morphological
markers for the distant future for Instance, does not
necessarily condemn a whole people to the "primitivism"
which Mbiti consciously or unconsciously implies. There
must be other ways by which East Africans can express the
notion of distant future, otherwise Ugandans in particular
(amongst whom there are so many saints) and East Africans
generally would not embrace Christianity which is dependent
on the concept of distant future as they have so staunchly
done.
And from the linguistic point of view, Mbiti's claim
is refuted by recent research by Johnson (1977, 1981) for
instance, who demonstrates using Gikuyu that concepts like
"distant" and "immediate" past (and Implicitly "distant
future") could be handled within her innovative "existential
status" which is proposed in order to provide a unified
account of time in Gikuyu and Bantu languages generally
(more about this in chapter four). We accept, following
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Whorf, that languages of the world may not express the
same concepts in the same way. What is in contention here
however, is the belief that a grammatical category like
aspect (or tense) cannot be treated across language as
indicated by Zandvoort and implied by Mbiti; that aspect
for instance, means something entirely different in Slavic
from what it means in other languages. This is patently
true if we are talking about the derivational or
inflectional morphology of aspect. But as we have
indicated, insistence on the morphological markedness of
aspect (and tense) leads to perverse generalisations about
the absence in some people of concepts of time or to
stubborn though inaccurate conclusions about how Slavonic
aspect must be.
And our position Is not entirely new. The
morphological non-parallelism of different languages
vis-a-vis AUX for example, has been noted before.
Anderson (1973: 46) has said representatively:
in languages which lack an auxiliary
construction, the simple form(where
one exists) of the verb can be used in
circumstances In which the auxiliary
form would be required in a language
like English
-28-
The point has been noted with regard to tense as
well. For example, Dubs (1958) reviewing Vendler's
(1957) verbal classification, argues that the tense
category need not be expected to be inflectionally or
derivationally marked in all languages of the world.
The concepts expressed by this category in one language
might be lexicalized for example, in another language.
Dubs (1958: 395) says that Vendler
appears unaware of the fact known to all comparative
linguists, namely, that, with unimportant exceptions,
only Aryan (Indo-European) languages possess tenses,
that is inflections that indicate past, present and
future time. The Chinese language, for example, is
entirely uninflected and finds no need for any
tenses. It goes along quite well by specifying
time, when desired, by an adverb, such as "now",
"yesterday" and so forth.
Apart from the bizarre claim implicit in Dubs'
relegation of many African, Amerindian and Australian
languages to the status of "unimportant exceptions", he
also utterly misses Vendler's point about the verbal
categorial classifications which are proposed. Vendler
is aware of the structural difference between languages.
-29-
He even concedes that the tests for progressiveness
which he uses to classify English verbs and verb phrases
would not be applicable to German (Cf. Vendler's 1958:
395-6, reply to Dubs) 0 Ironically then, both Dubs
(though rather ignorantly) and Vendler are making the
same point, that natural languages can either morphologize
or lexicalize time concepts (in certain cases, they can do
both in one language),
And the subject is not closed with Dubs and Vendler
either. In a recent article on aspect and tense Bach (1981),
working within Montague Grammar, similarly dismisses the
uncritical assumption of Whorfian Hopi metaphysics which
still has considerable influence on comparative linguistics
today. Here is a rough paraphrase of his position. That
people in different cultural environments speaking radically
different languages, cannot share common presuppositions
about what the world Is like, is an easy tenet to falsify.
For example, taking time to be the major defining parameter
for tense and aspect across different languages, it can be
shown that aspect and tense are effectively language-.
independent categories. Bach (1981: 79) continues:
Whatever truth there may be in Whorf's account
of Hop! metaphysics, I believe that he was
simply wrong about the "Standard Average
European" metaphysical assumption about
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time.... Moreover, ... I have yet to
encounter a language in which there Is
no reflection of the contrasts between
states, events, and processes.
As we claimed, each language might impose its own
idiosyncratic constraints on widely held concepts.
For Instance, one language might be more circumlocutory
in expressing or interpreting one concept than another.
Nonetheless communication(comprehension or retrieval of
Information) is possible. On this point Bach (ibid)
cautions, in fact: "This is not to say that the use they
(categories) are put to or the reflexes that we find are
identical across languages."
To come back to aspect, Garey (1957: 96) Implicitly
makes the point that if aspect is not marked overtly In
one language for such aspectual contrasts as perfectivity
and imperfectivity, telicity and atellcity and other
"privative oppositions", there are other means in which
these concepts are expressed or Interpreted. And most of
the recent literature on aspect 2 even from Slavonic
linguists takes the view that aspect must be treated as a
theoretical primitive, that is, aspectual concepts such
as Inception, completion etc. which are expressed by
inflectional and derivational morphology In Slavonic
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languages can also be otherwise expressed in other
languages. For example, arguing along the lines of
Verkuyl, Aqvist and other Slavic linguists, Hoepelmari
(1974: 161) representatively notes:
It has for a long time been thought, that
the aspects are a feature characterising
only slavic languages, but recent studies
show that they can be assumed in the basis
of other languages as well ...
And the rest of the article is a model-theoretic
demonstration of how aspect can be treated along these
lines. And this position is held without necessarily
rejecting the fact that in Slavonic languages aspectual
oppositions are systematically morphologized. To conclude
the point then, there is evidence from the literature that
although aspect (and tense) may be morphologically marked
in languages, this should be treated as the first stage
in understanding the category. Otherwise, after this
surface level has been identified, we must move on to the
abstract (or in Chomskyan terms the logical form) level.
Of the two, the abstract (conceptual) level Is the most
likely to produce a meaningful treatment of a given
grammatical category across language.
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Finally, further motivation for the claim that
aspect ought to be taken as a conceptual category in a
comparative description across several languages also
comes from data from a related discipline. Bronckart and
Sinclair (1973) quoting Ferreire's (1971) findings on
research done amongst French children on language
acquisition, claim that there is evidence from such
cognitive studies to show that aspect, its morphological
configurational complexity in Russian and Slavic generally
notwithstanding, is in fact, a much easier concept for
children to grasp than tense for instance. If this claim
is taken seriously, as indeed it is by Lyons (1977: 705),
1iller and J0bnson-Laird (1976) and others, we can only
conclude that our taking aspect across language as a
conceptual primitive could only enhance the understanding
of this otherwise mysterious categoryG
2.2 A note on aspectual merkedness generally
Treating aspect across language as a conceptual
primitive commits us however, to declaring our stand with
regard to aspectual marking which has been assumed
traditionally to be the central phenomenon in aspectual
studies. Let us make a quick run-through of one or two
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definitions of the markedness of aspect which have
influenced the thinking of such Slavonic linguists as
Zandvoort.
The standard definition of the markedness of aspect
which has been interpreted differently by various analysts
was first proposed by Jakobson (1957: 136)	 in a
pioneering work on verbal aspect in Russian thus:
The general meaning of a marked category states
the presence of a certain (whether positive or
negative) property A; the general meaning of the
corresponding unmarked category states nothing about
the presence of A, and is used chiefly, but not
exclusively, to indicate the absence of A. The
unmarked term is always the negative ol' the marked
term, but on the level of general meaning the
opposition of the two contradictories may be
interpreted as "statements of A" vs. "no statement
of A", whereas on the level of "narrowed", nuclear
meanings, we encounter the opposition "statement of
A" vs. statement of non-A".
This definition is instantiated by Jakobson's (p.137)
own examples of Russian verbal aspect, one of which, rather
truncated, we partially re-order in :
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1. (a) peE
	
(to sing)
(b) spe'
	
(to complete singing)
(c) dopevat' (to be in the final stage of
singing)
(d) dopet	 (to complete the final stage
of singing)
According to the definition of markedness given above,
I (b) is morphologically marked for completion, that is,
there appears to be a o.ne-to-one correspondence between
the presence of s- (or rather the combination of s- + p')
and the property (meaning) of completion which the newly
combined item signals. It is fair to assume therefore
that as long as the product of the combination of the
basic (unmarked) root of the verb pit' and the marker -
signals completion as a value, we have a sufficient case
of markedness by the above definition. But 1(a) which is
the basic, unmarked, form of the opposition, is neutral
to such interpretation; that is, It denotes neither
completion nor denial of completion of singing.
This type of markedness is the traditional Praguean
definition which, somewhat modifed has become standard in
phonological studies today i.e. the kind where markedness
values are mapped onto the positive or negative specification
of some distinctive feature, as developed and established
to a large degree by Chomsky and Ralle (1968).
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One other point might need making in respect of
1(a) - (d). Both I (c) and I (d) are morphologically
marked but I Cc) Is doubly marked, If we take the marked
member to be the one that has an extra morphological
element from its opposing pair I (d); that is,
imperfectivity can also be morphologically marked.
Comrie (1976: 112) makes a similar point when he says
that in Italian, Spanish, and English imperfectivity is
overtly marked. This matter is worth recording because
the impression is often given In the literature that it
is what indicates perfectivity (or boundedness, completion
etc) which is always the marked member in a given aspectual
opposition, and that the basic member, which is often
assumed to lexicalize imperfectivity (or incompletion,
progressiveness etc.) Is considered to be always unmarked.
Though this may be the case with some languages, it is
definitely not true of others.
The above cases in I involve the marking of the
contrast completion and non-completion or perfectivity
and imperfectivity. But there are other cases of aspectual
marking.
	
2. (a) Russian: (1) spat'	 (sleep)
(ii) pospat' (sleep for a short while)
	
(b) Finnish: (I) levt	 (rest)
(ii) levht	 (rest for a short while)
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The examples in 2 (taken from Carison, 1981: 33) are clear
cases of morphological and semantic marking where
derivational suffixes -hta and p- for Finnish and Russian
respectively mark a specified although vaguely delimited,
interval of time of "sleep" versus an unspecified interval
of time of sleep or one which is neutral to specificity.
We can now see why the notion of "privative opposition"
embedded in Jakobson's definition of rnarkedness and
exemplified by I and 2 has assumed such a great role in the
treatment of aspect: verbal aspect concerns the description
of contrastive temporal concepts embedded in pairs of
elements one of which has one or more extra morphological
or semantic item than the other. And these aspectual
oppositions for which the notion of markedness applies are
numerous. Jakobson (1957: 137-138) for instance, gives five
oppositions for aspect in Russian: (a) a perfective versus
imperfective contrast which is the central one; (b) within
iinperfective he gives determinate vs. indeterminate; Cc)
within imperfective and indeterminate there are iterattve
vs. non-iterative; (d) within imperfective there is also
the inceptive vs. non-inceptive contrast, and finally;
(e) within the inceptive there is peectivized vs. non-
perfectivized opposition. Nbte however, that all these
oppositions branch from the one major aspectual opposition
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perfective vs. imperfective which is claimed to be the
central choice in Russian and other Slavonic languages.
These contrasts can best be seen In the form of a tree
thus:
3,	 ASPECTUAL OPPOSITION (Following Jakobson, 1957)
Perfective	 Imperfective
Determinate/erminate	 Inceptive Noninc eptive
Iterative	 Noniterative Perfectivized Nonperfect-
ivized
The privative opposition as conceived of by Jakobson for the
treatment of aspect can therefore be reduced to one main
opposition perfectivity vs. imperfectivity with all other
facets falling under the iniperfectivity node as in 3.
Where these aspectual concepts are lexicallzed rather
than morphologized however, markedness has tended to be
associated with the different manifestations of the
temporal stretch which is assumed to be entailed by the verb
phrases (VPs) for Instance. Some VPs (or the propositions
which they partially express) entail durative time, punctual
time, dynamic time, progressive time etc. of the events,
processes or states which they describe. On these terms,
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sentences or propositions are marked for such oppositions
as stative vs. non-stative, durative vs. non-durative,
punctual vs. non-punctual, progressive vs. non-progressive
etc. (Cf. Lyons, 1977: 708).
On similar lines, Holisky (1981: 128) reduces these
contrasts for Georgian to only two. What is referred to
as "punctual" aspect subsumes aspectual concepts like
perfectivity, completion, inception, boundedness, non-
durative, non-dynamic etc. And "linear" aspect takes
account of durative, dynamic, progressive, non-conipletive,
Iterative, habitual etc. concepts. The literature also
refers to punctual and linear aspect by another more common
term. When VPs, adverbs (ADVs) or affixes, singly or In
their various combinations In utterances or the propositions
expressed by them are considered in contexts (more about
which in the next chapter), aspect is said to manifest
itself In the form of instants, intervals or subintervals
of time, some ol' which are open or closed etc. The point
that needs emphasizing at this stage is this, that as
aspect is treated within modern linguistic terms (e.g.
within model-theoretic, truth-conditional or possible
worlds semantics), we hear less and less about its
markedness. In other words, modern extensions of Jakobson's
definition of markedness for aspect naturally lead to the
treatment of this category at what we called the conceptual
level.
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Perhaps the clearest instance is provided by Ku'era
(1981) who, in extending Jakobson's definition of the
markedness of aspect for Czech, defines an aspectually marked
category thus:
4 • MARKED	 = LM (lexical meaning) + 0<
(distinctive feature)
UNMARKED = LM (no indication of 0< or, in certain
contexts -o ).
This way of formalizing markedness crystallizes the elegance
of Jakobson's definition. VPs for instance, ought to be
treated for aspect first lexically before the Influence of
extra distinctive features Is considered. And armed with
Vendler (1957), Kenny (1963), Verkuyl (1972, 1978 etc),
Dowty (1977, 1979) and others who assume that VPs, NPs, ADVs
and affixes all have inherent time schemata which are the
defining properties for their aspectual character, we can
demonstrate why 4 is accurate. Furthermore, .we can now
see why L1 which might not have affixes that express
aspectual concepts might equally express them through
their VPs or ADVs etc.
The limitation of rule 4 above however, might lie in
our assuming that all VPs for example, without their added
morphological or semantic distinctive features are
necessarily unmarked. As Ku'era (pp 181-188) himself
amply demonstrates, 4 has tended to be tied to the
4O-
morphology of aspect, which is a languagesspecific way
of treating aspect from which Kuera moves away. AU. in
all, when we view utterances from the standpoint of their
contribution to propositional structure, we are bound to
take morphological markedness less seriously than is
customary, even if we do not reject it entirely.
We have another motivation for taking aspectual markedness
less seriously however. The theory of markedness which is
applicable to the interpretation of aspect and tense across
language at the propositional level as we envisage it here
is simply not available. Even the proposals made in a
recent volume (Cf. Belletti et al. eds., 1981) dedicated
to the "Theory of markedness in generative grammar" are
applicable to the marking of aspect only in a very general
way. Obviously the theories themselves may not be intended
for the interpretation of utterances as we might wish therm
to be; but even that aside, of all the contributors to the
GLOW volume indicated (Chomsky included) for instance, only
Kean seriously bothers to show what the content of a modern
markedness theory might look like. Even hers however, does
not seem applicable to the treatment of aspect at the
conceptual level that we have in mind. And Kean herself
(1981: 559) makes the most sceptical remark about
markedness in the words:
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While, with increasing frequency, one
encounters references to markedness in the
literature, such discussions as there are
typically take place in the absence of
any attempt to define what the proper
domain of the markedness theories is or
to characterize their role in general
linguistic theory. Rather, what one
usually finds is that there is an implied
assumption that it is well understood what
theories of markedness are all about ...
When we talk about the marking of aspect and tense
in the next two chapters then, we are in effect claiming
no more than that there are affixes in natural language
that signal certain aspectual or tense concepts or which
are associated with them. Where aspectual concepts are
lexicalized, we will talk about semantic marking without
adhering to any new theory of "markedness". In other
words, aspectual or tense marking is construed here as
a term conveniently used to describe or interpret an
item in a given system: phonological, morphological,
syntactic or semantic. On these terms, unmarkedness
is merely default choice of one term in a given system.
-/+2
Before we close this section it might be in order
to indicate briefly the important role played by subjective
judgement or choice in marking aspect. The point is noted
throughout the literature. Forsyth (1970: 356) Indicates
how subjective choice is at work In the interpretation of
aspect in Russian generally. Comrie (1976: 112) also notes
that there is what might be called an asymmetrical (i.e.
one-way) relationship between a marked member and an
unmarked one in a given pair. He puts the relevant point
this way:
The meaning of the unmarked category can
encompass that of its marked counterpart
where overt expression of the meaning of the
marked category is always optional .. I.e.
where the unmarked category can always be
used even in a situation where the marked
category would also be appropriate.
On these terms, 1(a) in Jakobson's Russian example
above, can be used to express the concept that the marked
member of this opposition 1(b) might be expected to express.
And this is supposed to hold for all the cases of this type
of opposition. The opposite case however, where the marked
member expresses the concept which the unmarked member is
assumed to express, is not supposed to hold. This far, we
can say that the use of the marked member may be redundant.
But Friedrich (1974: 30) indicates that in the case
of' the Greek aorist, the perfective (the marked member)
has other sub-categories which can be used to refer to
imperfectivity, hence implying that in Greek the marked
category could also be used to refer to what "normally"
(i.e. conventionally . la Grice) might be expressed by the
unmarked category. The important point to remember about
this observation is that the decision between markedness
and unmarkedness can sometimes be subjectively determined
(or otherwise determined by specific contexts).
The role that subjective choice might play in deciding
whether an item is marked or not has also been made (and
almost exhausted) with regard to the other category we are
concerned with: tense. Leech (1971) and in a slightly
different context Smith, N. y . (1981 ) and many others, have
indicated that although tense markers have "default" meaning,
that is, although tense markers signal present time, past
time and future time for instance, given appropriate
contexts, the times signalled by these markers can be
overruled without inducing any ungrammaticality or
incomprehension of the utterances they express. The
phenomenon whereby the meaning of a marked member of a
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given category might be overruled in contexts, is therefore
widespread across other grammatical categories as well.
We should not be dismayed to note them or test their
applicability for aspect; but more seriously this Is another
motivation for treating aspect at the propositional
(conceptual) level.
And this has other important consequences. As we
clearly demonstrate in the next chapter, in the treatment
of utterances for aspect and tense generally, It Is wise
to take the distinction made by Grice (1968 etc.) between
the "conventional implicatures" (or meaning) of VPs, ADVs,
aspectual and tense markers or the propositions which they
express which constitute their semantics on the one hand
and the "conversational implicatures" encoded in utterances
where such VPs, ADVs and markers figure in contexts,
constituting their pragmatics, on the other.
In conclusion then, whether markedness comes in or
not, the interpretation of aspect and tense depends on
"default" meanings that lexical items and markers have;
but the speakers'/hearers' subjective choice or judgeinent
which may annul the Inherent meaning of a marked member
in an aspectual opposition for Instance, must also be
taken seriously as an important part of the treatment of
aspect and tense across language generally.
2.3 Towards a working definition of aspect
In this section, we take a few definitions of aspect
which corroborate our claim that we treat this grammatical
category across language conceptually. About aspect
Lyons (1977: 705) says:
The term "aspect" is currently used by linguists
as the rather unsatisfactory, but conventionally
accepted, translational equivalent of the term
that is employed in Russian ('vid') to refer
to the opposition perfective and imperfective
in Slavonic languages. Usually, though not
invariably, it is extended to cover a variety
of other oppositions, in so far as they are
grammaticalised in the structure of particular
languages - oppositions based upon the notions
of duration, instantaneity, frequency, initiation,
completion etc.
This definition Is broadly consonant with Comrie's
(1976: 3) which takes aspect as "different ways of viewing
the internal temporal constituency of a situation". We
assume therefore that aspect concerns different ways of
viewing temporal notions such as duration, initiation etc.
though Comrie is vague about what constitutes the "situation"
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(Cf. Ivlacaulay's, 1978 review of Comrie and Friedrich for
other limitations of the definitions of aspect).
To understand Comrie's "internal temporal constituency
of a situation" perhaps we must turn to Friedrlch (1974: Si)
who defines aspect generally thus:
Aspect, by one general definition,
signifies the relative duration or
punctuality along a time line that
may inhere in words or constructions.
Friedrich's definition of aspect hinges on the notion of a
temporal line which is not necessarily one-directional,
although discussions which take the temporal continuum or
line to be the major defining characteristic of aspect tend
to assume its one-dimensional feature (Cf. Dowty and those
linguists who work within interval semantics e.g. Kamp, 1979).
Note also that "duration" and "punctuality" are to be taken
as "relative" which captures the opposition embedded in
Lyons' definition. And in a truth-conditional treatment
duration and punctuality are usually referred to by the
interval and the instant of time respectively. That Is,
propositions which are characteristically durative are
evaluated for their truth at intervals of time and punctual
propositions are true at instants of time (though at times
the truth of the proposition at an interval of time entails
its truth at instants of time too).
Alternatively, these intervals or instants of time
are to be mapped or located on the time line in order for
us to understand the internal mechanism of aspect. Note
finally, that the invervals or instants of time (duration
or punctuality) have to be assumed to irthere in "words"
and "constructions". We can now see why Friedrich's
definition is the most fruitful. It is in line with the
claim made by Vendler (1957), Kenny (1963), Garey (1957),
Verkuyl (1972 etc.), Dowty (1977, 1979) and others that
VPs, NPs, ADVs etc. have inherent time schemata by which
they are classified. As we indicate in the next chapter,
a careful study of the verbal categories as proposed by
Vendler and others shows how such aspectual concepts as
inception, completion, habituality, instantaneity, iteration,
continuity, etc which are systematically morphologized in
Slavic are clearly characterized in VPs or the propositions
which they express.
In treating aspect across languages like Yao, Che'a
and English then, we shall assume following Sperber and
Wilson in the above epigraph that such concepts as
inception, completion etc can be expressed morphologically,
lexically, sententially or propositionafly in different
languages without changing them.
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2.4 Conclusion
Our argumentation has led us to the conclusion that
in Slavic aspectual concepts (e.g. completion, boundedness,
inception, habituality etc.) are expressed predominantly
by inflectional and derivational morphology. But as we
are going to show in the next chapter, there are languages
like Yao, Che*a and English which express such concepts by
and large lexically. And given the verbal categories proposed
for natural language according to the time schemata which
they entail, we can indicate how such a mysterious category
as aspect could be demystified when treated language-
independently. It is to a demonstration o± this that we
must now turn.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
1.	 This chapter and the next concentrate on "aspect".
"Tense" in Yao and Che*a, however poorly analyzed, has had
at least some treatment in such pedagogical grammars as
Sanderson (1922) and Whlteley (1966) for Yao and Watkins
(1937) and Price (1962) for Che*a. But aspect has been
largely ignored in such studies. It is aspect therefore,
rather than tense, that requires the more Immediate
attention in the description and interpretation of these
languages and, indeed, of African languages generally. We
discuss tense in chapter four.
The need to concentrate on aspect is also motivated
by a glance at the descriptions of African languages
themselves, where aspect is considered to be almost non-
existent (Cf. Welmers, 1973). Only Hausa appears to have
been "discovered" to be aspectual (Cf. Cowan & Schuh, 1976)
in the sense that in Hausa aspect is marked morphologically
almost to the same extent as it is in Slavic. But Cowan
& Schuh's aspectual description of Hausa is not extensive
enough to show its influence on linguistic theory generally
for example. This is understandable.
It is also understandable that "verbal aspect" should
have been so poorly treated In the description of African
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languages: verbal aspect has tended to be the strict
preserve of Slavonic languages where it is more clearly
morphologized or marked than in English for instance.
Also, the earliest grammarians of African languages
(most of whom were West Europeans) could not bring Into
Africa a linguistic tradition of the description of
"verbal aspect" which was largely alien to the description
of West European languages.
But the situation is changing fast. On the African
scene, Johnson (1977, 1981) has recently indicated for example,
that aspect generally not only exists in such Bantu
languages as Gikuyu, but that it exists in such a way
that linguistic theory itself is positively influenced.
Her (1981) innovative category "existential status",
proposed in order to account within a unified description
for the appropriate interpretation of aspectual and tense
phenomena specific to that Kenyan language for Instance,
is a case in point.
Moreover, any truth-conditional, model-theoretic
or possible worlds treatment of aspect and tense, be it for
Slavic or other languages, makes a tacit assumption of the
universal existence of aspect in natural language (Cf.
Aqvist, Hoepelman, Dowty etc.). Even confused overviews
Intended to give a general feel for the nature of aspect
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in Slavic and other languages, indicate how aspect
really ought to be treated at the theoretical (conceptual)
level rather than merely at the morphological level where
it had been left for many years (Cf. Majewicz, 1982).
2. See for example, Friedrich, 1974; Comrie, 1976;
Lyons, 1977; Verkuyi, 1972, 1973, 1976, 1978; and the
articles in Tedeschi & Zaenen, eds: 1981; and for one
important case study concerning an African language
(Gikuyu spoken in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania) see
Johnson, 1977, 1981. See also the bibliography for others.
3. Although Jakobson's article in question first appeared
in 1957, it is now more accessible in the second volume of
his Selected Writings: Word and Language. All the pages we
quote here refer to this volume.
4. See Platzack (1979: 52) who, following Goldsmith &
Woisetschlaeger claims that "the representation of time
as a one-dimensional line is not a specific enough model"
See also Newton-Smith (1980) for a discussion of the
structure of time which includes non-linear time e.g.
branching time. The notion of branching time is also
usually contained in discussions of future tense or time
in natural language; see for example, Tedeschi(1981).
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CHAPTER THREE
VERBAL CATEGORIES, MARKERS AND ASPECT IN
YAO, CHEWA AND ENGLISH
3,0 Introduction
In this chapter we demonstrate that such concepts as
Inception, completion, continuity, habituality, iteration, etc.
which define "verbal aspect t' and are systematically
grarnmaticalized in Slavic are, by and large, lexicalized in
Yao, Chea and English; and only to a small extent grammaticalized.
To illustrate how these aspectual concepts are lexicalized in
natural language generally, and in Yao, Chea and English
in particular, we take as our point of departure, the
discussion of the verbal categories proposed by Vendler (1957)
and Kenny (1963) and elaborated by Dowty (1977, 1979),
Nourelatos (1981) and others. We indicate specifically
how the time schemata which Vendler and others have assumed
to characterize sets of verbs and verb phrases in natural
language are in fact, what Slavonic linguists have all
along taken to be the defining features of verbal aspect.
But as we indicate, VPs are not alone in encoding these
time schemata. Adverbials and noun phrases as well as
morphological markers also encode the same time structures
as VPs.
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Building on the proposals made by Verkuyl (1972 etc.),
Declerck (1979a, b) and others we therefore indicate that a
more complete picture of how language lexicalizes and
grarnmaticalizes aspectual concepts (specifically in Yao
and CheQa), emerges after we have treated the VPs in a
given category in the context of items from such categories
as adverbials, noun phrases etc. (that is, if we look at
aspect sententially).
We conclude by suggesting that if VPs in a given
category or any aspectual markers of
	
the utterances in
which they figure are semantically multivalent, as
Nourelatos (1981:196) would have it, and this multivalence
is not resolved semantically, then we have to go beyond
semantics and search for the pragmatic principles that
cause such VPs or markers or constructions to change their
category or the concepts which they intrinsically signal.
In other words, apart from the indeterminacy of the category
to which certain VPs (e.g. "see") or certain markers (e.g.
the progressive marker -ku-in Yao and Chea) or certain
constructions might naturally belong (Cf. below), there
are both linguistic and extra-linguistic factors which
cause speakers to use a VP of one category to refer to a
state, an event or a process which another VP might describe.
One such factor is the speaker's choice of the relevant item
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in some context, i.e. the issue must be resolved by
pragmatics.
3.1	 The Limitations of the Vendlerian Verbal Categories
Before indicating how the verbal categories proposed
by Vendler and others relate to the description and
interpretation of aspect, let us make a few remarks about
some widely acknowledged limitations of the verbal
classification which we adopt. First, we accept that the
verbal categories which we discuss below were not proposed
with the specific intention of describing or interpreting
the linguistic facet of aspect. However, their obvious
relevance to aspectual matters renders their exploitation
essential.
Secondly, and perhaps more seriously, Vendler himself
concedes that there are verbs like "see" for example, which
are"puzzling" as they do not seem to belong to any "natural
class" of verbs. The implication here is that the verbal
categories proposed might not therefore be reliable in
reflecting facts about the real world. Our reply is this:
the fact that some VPs are multicategorial need not nullify
the whole system. We assume with Lyons (1981) and others
for example, that it is a common feature of almost all
classifications of linguistic material which might be
called "proto-typical" in outlook, that certain members of
the proposed categories be "fuzzy" or Indeterminate. This
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assumption appears to be supported by recent research in
cognitive studies (especially from that branch known as
the "semantic memory theory"). Hampton (1982) for example,
reports that on the interpretation of natural categories,
that is, on deciding whether an item belongs to one category
or another subjects consistently accept the truth of certain
category statements in spite of the fact that they are aware
of counter-examples. In such situations, subjects take
sentences like "an item A belongs to the category X" to
mean that the statement is "true" (either by testing the
item for class inclusion or for overlap of semantic features
with other items or both) only "typically" or "generally
speaking". The quick answer to our query then is: we
suggest that in those cases where VPs are indeterminate as
to the category to which they belong, we take these verbal
categories as a guide to their use rather than as a rule.
Finally, the progressive-form test which is repeatedly
used by Vendler and others to classify the VPs, (that is,
the division of the VPs according to whether or not they
can co-occur with the progressive morphological marker)
Is not universally applicable. This is recognized by
Vendler himself however, when he says, ".. in German I
could not argue from the difference between verbs that do
and those that do not admit continuous tense ..." (Cf.
Vendler, 1958: 395-396, Philosophical Review, LXIV). In
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fact, below we ignore the progressive-form test for the
classification of the VPs because all VPs in Yao and Cbera
take the progressive marker without inducing ungram-
maticality of the sentences or utterances in which they
appear (as in the case of German noted by Vendler above).
We assume therefore that this test is specific to
languages like English. Secondly, the discussion of the
progressive marker in Yao and Chea is provided separately
though briefly below, in order to minimize the confusion
indicated in the literature as to whether the progressive
marks aspect or tense.
It is the entailment tests developed largely by
Kenny (1963) as well as Vendler, Dowty (1977,1979) and
others of course, that we exploit for the classification
of the VPs below. The entailment tests are not only to a
large extent language-independent, but more important,
they set the scene for a better understanding of the truth-.
conditional treatment of aspect which permeates the
literature and which we discuss rather informally in the
last two chapters. Having cleared this hurdle, we can
now proceed to consider the verbal categories as proposed
by Vendler.
32 The time schemata encoded in activities and states
3.2.1
The first category of VPs which Veridler proposes is
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that referred to as "activity" VPs. The following is a
small sample:
I I1. Y: -utuka
9..
-lila
-tiit ngTh
- I I
-kwemba son
-lrig
-ng'ambil
-kwnd ( -jnd)
I
-uta
C: -thmng
-lila
-knkh ngTh
I	 I
-sUta fodya
I
-werenga
-
-sarnbila
-yndà
- %
-koka
E: run
cry
push a cart
smoke
read/count
swim
walk
pull
The VPs in 1 are characterized by an inherent time
stretch which Is indefinite (or might be said to flow
indefinitely). In other words, the situation described
by activity VPs in I takes place in an indefinite time span.
For example, when the VP is in the progressive form as in 2
where the progressive marcer -ku- is used (more about -ku-
below),
S	 '1 - S2. Y: tu-ku-utuka
C: ti-k-thmng
E: we are running
the time span of the running is not specified and, but for
extra-linguistic limitations of health, could go on
indefinitely.
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Another characteristic of activity VPs or the
propositions which they might express, includes the fact
that the proposition expressed by 2 entails its "perfect"
counterpart in:
%	 93. Y: tu-utwiche
%C: ta-tharnanga
E: we have run
This in turn indicates that any part of the time encoded in
progressive activity VPs or propositions partly expressed
by them has the same value as the whole. Activities are
therefore characterized by their inherent homogeneous
temporal structure. This explains their easy co-occurrence
with durational adverbials or adverbials which denote a closed
or open interval of time as in:
94: Y: tu-utwich ola jimo
-C: ta-thamanga ola lxmodz
E: we've run for one hour
And predictably, activity VPs can also co-occur with
interval-time ADVs whose temporal path Is smaller than
the "one hour" above. Ideally, even an indivisible
int?rval (i.e. an instant) time adverbial goes with activity
VPs without any danger of inducing ungramrnaticality as is
exemplified by 5.
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5. Y: ti-utwiche pa teni klk
C: t-thmng p tn klk
E: we ran at ten o'clock
Two conclusions can be drawn from this brief though
sufficient temporal characterization of activity VPs.
First, the indefinite and homogeneous time stretch which
is inherently encoded in activity VPs or the propositions
which they express, can be easily represented as an open
temporal continuum (or path or line) as in:
6
This graphic representation for the aspectual concept of
duration is effectively what is implied in Friedrich's
definition of aspect which we looked at in the last chapter.
The difference might be that in general, duration involves
the potential closure of the temporal line and 6 indicates
its indefinite continuity.
The temporal stretch denoted by activity VPs could
also be represented differently. For example, if (ACT)
stands for the activity category of the VP, t, for the
time stretch, and NDE] for the concept of indefiniteness of
the time stretch, we might capture the temporal entailment
relation for activities in general as in 7:
7.VP
(ACT)
C: -gnz
-
-fun a
.4 S
-zizila
-dz.wa
-
-khâl ndl
6
-mva
-1milrla
short list of VPs:
. q8. Y: -ganlsya
-sk
4'	 4'
-sisima
-mnyili l
-l61
_	 -
-Wa ne/.-tama ne
-phikn
-
-lamula
E: think
want/love/like
be cold
know
see
have/contain
understand/hear
ml e
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The schema in 7 says simply, that an activity VP denotes
an indefinite time stretch. Alternatively, 7 implies that
the appropriate interpretation of a proposition partially
expressed by an activity VP involves the knowledge of the
indefinite time stretch which it denotes.
Secondly, the potential for the truth-conditional
treatment of the proposition expressed in part by activity
VPs can now be seen. With what has just been noted, it is
easy to see why we should assign the truth of activity
propositions at both the instant and interval or subinterval
of time along the lines of Bennett & Partee (1978) and others.
That is, the truth of 2 entails the truth of 3, an observation
which gathers its relevance in the following chapters.
3.2.2
The second verbal category we would like to consider
is referred to as "state" and is exemplified by the following
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The VPs in 8 are characterized by the description of states
of mind or affairs or qualities. States differ from
activities because they are not dynamic whereas activities
are. Stative VPs encode an enduring temporal structure,
i.e. they can be represented as in 6 above, but their
inherent time "endures" over the whole given interval of
time (long, short or indefinite). They can therefore be
naturally predicated over adverbials which signal closed
or open intervals of time because of their inherent
temporal durative character as is exemplified by 9 and 10
respectively.
9. Y: ChWajabu wa-lamwile yk ' mchch
4C: WSjabu a-na-lamulila zaka zinai
E: Wajabu ruled for four years
-10. Y: Chewajabu wa-lamwile cia jimo
- -	 ,	 -C: Wajabu a-na-lamulila ola limodz
E: Wajabu ruled for one hour
In these cases Wajabu's ruling persists or "endures"
for the whole of the four year duration in the case of 9
and for the whole of the hour-long duration in the case of
10. It does not make sense to divide the temporal stretch
for states into instants or subintervals of time as we
might do for activity VPs because, we would like to suggest
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there are no gaps in the temporal continuum for stative
VPs or the propositions which their utterances might
encode. In other words, whereas there may be gaps in
the temporal structure for activity VPs or their
propositions (Cf. presently below and the last two
chapters for a fuller though informal treatment of this
point), t1-ere are none in states. Consequently, in a
truth-conditional treatment of the sentences in 9 or
10, the truth Of either of the propositions expressed
must be evaluated "for" the whole interval of time over
which the state endures.
And where the "stative proposition" is predicated
over an instant-time adverbial as in:
%	 - -- -.	 ..	 '	 -11. Y: CheWajabu wa-lamwiie kmbrndi kampepe
'	 ,SC: VJjbi.'.i a-na-lamulila icamphindi k'àmd'dz kkh
E: Wajabu ruled for one second only
or as in:
- _.% %	 % , S -12. Y: CheWajabu wa-tandite ku-.Lamula pa teni klk
- -C: 1aabu a-na-yamba ku-lamulil pa teni koloko
E: wajabu started to rule at ten o'clock
the truth of the proposition expressed by 11 and 12 is
evaluated at the said second or at the stroke of ten
respectively. 2
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And again following 7 above, we might represent the
temporal entailment for stative VPs (STA) (or the
propositions which their utterances might express) and
the time stretch t, which among other things is "enduringt'
[EN1Ji) as in:
13. VP -	 t [ENDUJ
(S TA)
The schema in 13 claims that a stative VP (or the
proposition it might partially express) entails an
enduring time stretch or alternatively might be expected
to be predicated over an "enduring" temporal stretch
encoded in KDVs for example.
3.3	 The essential difference between states and activities
We have indicated above that activity and state VPs
are similar because they are both durative and they have
an indefinite time continuum which is also homogeneous.
The graphic representation in 6 therefore sufficiently
captures these similarities. However, 6 conceals one
major difference between these two verbal categories, which
we have already alluded to in passing. It is a difference
which deserves further mention because it keeps cropping
up in various manifestations in the literature. We will
first, simply stipulate the difference between states and
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activities; and then proceed to Justify our stipulation.
We will assume first then, that the time stretch
encoded in activity VPs (or the propositions which they
might express) is discrete or has gaps; but the time
stretch encoded in state VPs has no gaps. Running is
not an enduring activity. One can be said to have been
'running' although one might have in fact, stopped for a
minute to pull out a bothersome thorn in one's foot. But
once one rules, or loves, or thinks etc.. the state endures
(or lasts) for the duration it takes.
The assumption that state VPs denote an enduring
time stretch which activity VPs do not, captures another
phenomenon which is common in human communication. In
ordinary discourse, we often say, using stative VPs like
"know", "see" or "understand" etc. that one either knows,
sees, understands or one does not. There are no half measures
with regard to the processing of such stative utterances.
And where half measures exist as when one says one "half
sees", "half understands" or one "gradually knows" etc.
we suggest that these are cases which indicate "imperfect"
seeing etc. with no relation to time at all i.e. such VPs
are used in a non-aspectual sense. In some cases such
utterances are interpreted as signalling iteration or
gradual development of the state (as is exemplified by our
interpretation of inchoative sentences: Cf. below).
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All this may sound speculative, and it is. But it
helps explain why sentences like 14 are unacceptable.
14. *We are understanding English.
The reason for the nonacceptability of stative sentences
like 14 has bothered linguists for many years. Viach (1981)
probably offers the most useful starting point when he says
a sentence like 14 is unacceptable because both the state
VP "understand" and the progressive marker (operator)
denote the same duration of time; the implication is that
one of them is therefore i'edundant. He puts the point
this way (p.274), "The function of the progressive operator
is to make stative sentences, and, therefore, there is no
reason for the progressive to apply to sentences that are
already stative" - a point which is made in the spirit of
Palmer (1974) as Vlach acknowledges. However, this does
not explain why Conrie's (1976) favourite counter-example
(in our 15) is grammatical and acceptable:
15.	 understanding more about quantum mechanics
as each day goes by.
There is an even more surprising fact which is so
obvious that it usually gets forgotten. Throughout the
discussion of the verbal categories as proposed by Vendler
-66-
and others, it is repeatedly claimed that durative VPs
easily co-occur with durative ADVs and/or morphological
markers which signal duration or process. Both state
VPs and progressive operators (or markers) are claimed
to denote durative time. Naturally they ought therefore
to co-occur without inducing ungrammaticality or non-
acceptability of the sentences in which they appear.
Viach cannot therefore be right about the reason why 14,
say, is unacceptable. Whatever he means by "progressive
operator" if he is using the term to express the notion
of progressivity or continuity (or process) which is often
signalled in English by the various forms of "be" + "V - ing"
then his rule is, to say the least, incomplete. The concept
of PROCESS or progressivity signalled by the progressive
operator does not always make activities, or achievements
and accomplishments (Cf. below) stative. The function of
the progressive operator is not to make stative sentences,
it is rather to signal a "process" which goes on in time or
to denote an indefinite time stretch which is construed
exactly as in activity VP constructions which we have just
seen represented in 6.
If we assume that both the progressive marker (operator)
and activity VPs denote a time stretch which is indefinite
and discrete i.e. has gaps, we can understand why activity
VPs and progressive markers should co-occur without creating
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ungrammatical or unacceptable constructions and why
state VPs which denote gapless time continua should not
potentially co-occur with progressive markers which denote
discrete time continua: the two time structures clash.
And where their presence in one construction is grammatical
or acceptable as in 15 above, the construction is not
strictly stative; it signals iterative interpretation or
a discretely continuous temporal structure encoded largely
by the progressive marker whose temporal structure as it
were, overwhelms that of the VP.
Let us underline one point however. We do not deny
that the progressive marker (or any marker) can make non-
stative VPs stative. This fact is not only noted through-
out the literature (Cf. Mourelatos, 1981, and others) but
in fact, we indicate below that Yao has a special
morphological marker "-ga" which, in the context of the
progressive (or imperfective) marker "-ku-" signals
stativity, i.e. "-ku- + V -ga' 1 has the chief function of
inducing stativity. We simply suspect here that with
data from Yao and Chea, the major function of the
progressive operator (marker) is not to make sentences
stative. Their chief function is to denote process or
continuity which in the context of certain VPs (e.g.
stative VPs) induces an iterative or "inchoative" (Cf.
below) interpretation of the utterances in which they
appear, thereby often changing their category.
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3.11 The time schemata encoded in accomplishment end
achievement Vi's
3.4.1
The next group of Vi's we discuss briefly is that
called "accomplishment". It is exemplified by the
following short list of Vi's:
-	 -	 .-	 _
Y: -jambula lindand C: -jambula dzIra E: draw an egg
(a circle)
-tik mjh
-t	 nyimb
- -
-1 ama
.f -	 - -
-.mila mtela
- ..	 - -
-ulaga nguku
-pngny mpnd
-thrn(ng mjh
-	 - -
-manga nyumba
-chila
-
-meza mankhwala
-phd' nkhGki
-knz mpnd
run a race
build a house
grow up
recover from illness
swallow (take)
mediCine
kill a chicken
make a chair
Broadly speaking accomplishment VPs have an intrinsic time
continuum which is usually taken to be closed finally. This
is why they are often said to be characteristically durative
though the emphasis here is that these Vi's express events
which proceed towards an end-point. The temporal stretch
encoded by such VPs might therefore be captured by the
graphic representation In 16:
16. -
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With the assumption implicit in the closure of the
temporal line in 16, "to make a chair" implies the eventual
existence of the chair; "to build a house" is to complete
building it; "to draw an egg or a circle" is to complete
drawing it etc. (Cf. the last two chapters for further
discussion of the limitations of these assumptions). On
these terms,accomplishment VPs or their constructions
denote what Slavonic linguists have referred to as
"completive" aspect, which is morphologized in Slavic.
The general rule which might capture these assumptions
might take the shape of 17.
17.	 VP	 ) t [coiJ
(Acco)
17 claims that an accomplishment (ACCO) VP denotes a time
stretch t, which is characteristically completive EOJPLJ
Working within truth-conditional semantics, the
consequences of the schema in 17 are apparent. The
interpretation of accomplishment VPs or the processing of
propositions partially expressed by them, involves the
evaluation of their truth not only for or at the duration
of time denoted by the VP but often their truth is evaluated
at the end-point of the event or at the closure of the
temporal line. For instance, It is normal to assume in
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- -
	 4	 ..	 - %18. Y:	 WJbti a-utwiche mjaho
-	 - 4 4	 - %C: Wa,jabu wa-thamanga injaho
E: Wajabu has run the race
that the race has now reached its intended finishing line and
Wajabu has stopped running. The truth of the proposition
expressed by 18 must therefore be assigned at the end-
point of the race, not before.
That 17 has limitations with respect to the processing
or interpretation of utterances which have accomplishment
VPs however, is clearly demonstrated when we consider a
sentence like 19 which is in the progressive form. The
appropriate interpretation of 19 cannot be provided by
appealing to the rule schema in 17 alone.
19. Y: ChWjbi -titwch-j mjh
4 -	 -	 .-C: iajàbi a-ma-thamanga mah
E: Wajabu was running the race
The first interpretation of 19 might clearly be in
accordance with 17, that is, 19 might indicate that Wajabu
completed running the race, or that the race reached an
end-point. But as we also know Wajabu could have been
too tired to continue running the race; that is, the
entailment of the completion of the race is cancellable as
can be seen from the grammaticality and acceptability of 20:
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6	 1	 .	
-	
'	 .	
- % -
20. Y: CheWajabu a-utwiche-e mjaho wo nambo nganamala
-.' S	 -	 •	 tC: Wajabu a-ma-thamanga mjaho wo koma sanatsilize
E: Wajabu was running the race but he did not
complete it
However, the indeterminacy of interpretation between completive
and non-cornpletive reading in 19 to a large extent vanishes
when it is taken to indicate past habituaJ.ity.
The other problem about the interpretation of
accomplishment VPs concerns a subset of these VPs which is
usually referred to as inchoatives. VPs like -kml (Yao),
-psy (Chea) (ripen, mature); -kl (Yao), -kCil (Chea)
(grow up, mature) etc. belong to this group. The problem
with these VPs and the processing of the propositions which
they might partially express is that the end-point which is
entailed and is clearly captured by 17 above, is not in fact,
clearly demarcated. To put the matter illustratively, if we
utter 21,
- -21. Y: Yernbe sila si-kmel
C: Nng6' âjà a-psy&
E: The mangoes are ripe (have ripened)
although the semantic rule represented in 17 indicates that
we assume that the expected end-point of the ripening oi' the
mangoes has been reached, common sense tells us that there
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might be other stages earlier than this end-point when the
mangoes could quite acceptably be referred to as ripe. This
is so because these VPs entail a gradually flowing temporal
stretch whose end-point is usually subjectively decided
upon. iThat is mature or grown up to us might not be the
same to others (although in some cases consensus is possible).
The problem might disappear if we simply claim la
Grice (1975), that with regard to inchoative VPs and the
propositions which they partially express, 17 should be
interpreted thus: an accomplishment VP which is inchoative
"conversationally implicates" its end-point. This will
account for the possibility of interpreting such examples as
20 appropriately as well.
3.4.2
Finally, let us briefly consider the last VP category
referred to as "achievement" VPs which are exemplified by the
following short list:
22. Y: -tnd
- -
-malisya
.4•	
_%
-simana
- ty 6k
-
-tandila
-w
-pgw(
e
-ng' anima
- 4', '
-ul.ica
C : -ymbâ
-maliza
- %
-peza
S
-ch6ka
-	 .,
-yambilà
-f a
-ba dwa
-	 S
-ng'an.ima
-phCilk
E: start
finish/stop
find
leave
resume
die
be born
flash
explode/burst
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The VPs in 22 are characterized by an instantaneous time
which they denote. Achievements by definition, are non-
durative i.e. they do not normally occur over or throughout
a temporal stretch. They do not take a durative or an
interval of time adverbial; instead they co-occur with
point-time adverbials as in 23:
23. Y: Ltyâl lila li-uliche pa teni koloko
.e -% ..	 'C: Talaya lij l-phti1ika pa tn kl3k
E: The tyre exploded/burst at ten o'clock
The instantaneous character of achievement VPs
indicates that they do not normally take the progressive
form without changing their verb category or losing their
"instantaneous character" Even where the progressive form
occurs as with a VP like "die" in 24:
.%	 'p24. Y: Ltn LLla li-ku-wa
SC: Fisi ujà -ki-f(
E: The hyena is dying
the entailment rule in 25:
25. X is V -ing_________ X has V -ed
fails to apply. In other words, we cannot deduce from
24 that 26 is true.
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# -	 % 126. Y: Litunu l.la .i-wi.ile
C F ' %.%isi ua wa-ia
E: The hyena is dead/has died
Achievement VPs can obviously be represented as dots
or strokes on a page, which we will not bother indicating.
However, 1±' we take (ACHIE) to stand for achievement VPs,
t for the time-point and NST, [aEsu] , UNC ,	 LI1
to represent such concepts as instantaneity for VPs like
"explode", resumption for VPs like "resume", Inception
for VPs like "start" and climax or completion for VPs
like "end" respectively, we might sum up the time t,
denoted by achievement VPs and the propositions partially
expressed by their constructions as:
NSTJ
J1Esu:ft
27. VP
	 \f] I
(AcHIE)
	 j[LIMJ
The schema in 27 claims simply, that an achievement VP or
the proposition encoded by the utterance in which it appears
entails one of the four aspectual concepts of instantaneiy,
resumption, inception or climax (i.e. completion) of the
event described.
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3.L3 Accomplishments and achievements as essentially events
A brief word about the similarities and differences of
accomplishment and achievement VPs thus discussed is flow in
order. First, it is clear that achievements are instant .
-aneous in a way that accomplishments are not. There are
VPs like "flash", "explode", "snap" etc which denote
dimensionless time and might therefore be said to properly
belong to achievement VPs. No similar group of VPs is
easily discernible from the accomplishment VP category.
On these terms, we can justify the existence of both
verbal categories.
There are other VPs however, which belong to either
category by chance, as it were. Kenny (1963), Mourelatos
(1981) and others have consistently pointed these out,
suggesting thereby that accomplishment and achievement
VPs ought really to be conflated into one category as
"performances" or "events" according to Kenny and
Mourelatos respectively. Achievement VPs like "find",
"die", "be born", "finish" and accomplishment VPs such
as "grow up", "make a chair", "draw a circle" etc. ought
really to belong to one category as they all denote a
temporal stretch (however short or long) which has a
potential end-point. In other words, all these VPs
can effectively be represented graphically as in 16
above, without loss of any important generalisations about
their internal temporal structure.
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It also makes a lot of sense to subsume these
categories under one umbrella when we adopt the truth.'
conditional treatment of aspect.
V.	 •%	 I I	 -28. Y: Nwanache 3ula tu-m-sumene pa teni kolok
1% •	 •.	 -	 S	 %	 - 'C: Nwna ujà ta-mu-peza pa teni kolbko
E: We found (have found) the child at ten o'clock
The achievement VP in 28 (or rather the proposition which it
partially expresses) is evaluated for its truth not only at
the instant of time provided i.e. ten o'clock but also at
any subsequent time after ten. Similarly, the proposition
partially expressed by the accomplishment VP in 29:
5 5	 ,29. Y: Nwnche a-misile singano p tn kblk
-	
St1.	 - -Nwana w-tnèz singano pa tn klk
E: The child (has) swallowed the needle at
ten o'clock
is normally evaluated for its truth at the appropriate
instant (i.e. ten o'clock) and at any subsequent time
after ten. Obviously, both swallowing a needle and finding
a child take some time stretch to reach their end-point at
which their truth is evaluated; both 28 and 29 also take
the instantaneous time adverbial "at ten o'clock"; the
general similarity of the two VP categories is therefore
assured. As long as we are aware of these similarities and
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differences between the two VP categories then it should
not matter whether we conflate them under "event VPs" or
discuss them separately as we have done above.3
3.5 Verbal reduplication and iterative aspect in Yao and Chea
3.5.1 Iterative VPs in Yao, Chwa and English
Before we close the discussion of Vendler's verbal
classifications, we might do well to indicate one area
which these categories fail to emphasise. Only when
Vendler talks about the existence of the "spotting" sense
of the stative VP like "seeing", are we reminded about
this important though by and large forgotten area. The
literature on aspect Is not unanimous as to whether
"iteration" Is aspectual or merely expresses different
forms of quantification. In certain cases however, a
compromise is struck when iteration is treated within
"aspect and quantification" (Cf. Carison, 1981). But look
at the following VPs:
- - %30. Y: -teternela
- --	 •_ .'
.-tenaa nomba
-ndndimh
-kCipil
• - ,. .,C: -njenjernela
•
-panga njomba
d -	 -
-'chita masale
-kh/-d6nth
-kipfl
E: tremble
dribble (ball game)
twitch
drip/leak
bi ink
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From a quick look at this short list of VPs, we can
tell that what groups them together is the "number" or the
"iteration" or the "frequency" of the times of the event
which they denote. VPs like "twitch" and "blink" denote
at least one movement in time (and space of course);
whereas VPs like "dribble" and "tremble" denote more than
one movement in time. Clearly the interpretation of
utterances where such VPs appear, will naturally be somewhat
influenced by this intrinsic character. For example, such
VPs will tend to co-occur with frequency adverbials as can
be seen from 31:
4.	 4.	 -31. Y: Ltik6p lyangu lu-ndundumile kàm/kilI
- -
	 % 4. 4.
	
4. - - 4.
	 4• 4_•C: Chk6p changa chapanga masale kamodzl/Kawlrl
E: ?y eye-lid twitched (has twitched) once/twice
Similarly, VPs like "tremble" will tend to co-occur with
frequency adverbials which denote more than one time or one
movement. In other words, these VPs or the propositions
which they partially express entail some form of potential
iteration of the events they describe or denote. The
interpretation of utterances with such VPs therefore
involves some knowledge (conscious or unconscious) of
this inherent iterative behaviour.4
-70_
3.5.2 Verbal reduplication in Yao and Che*a
Yao and Chea also have a system of encoding iteration
by the reduplication of their verb roots. The following is
a short list of VPs representative of each of the VP
categories we have so far discussed (the fifth is an
inchoative VP which constitutes a sub-class of accomplishment
VPs).
32. Y: -tk-titkà	 C: -thm4ng-thm(ng E: run many times
-mv-mv	 hear
- %	 •	 ' -• -
-i!tuka-utuka mjh -thmanga-tbamanga
mj ah
-pgw-pgw	 -bgdwã-bdwa
- -. %	 % S
	 -
-icomala-komala	 -psya-lpsya
run a race
be born
ripen!
mature
As can be seen from 32, VPs from all the four categories
can be reduplicated. What is important however, is the
provision of the appropriate interpretation when these VPs
are reduplicated. In fact, this might be the stage to clear
an important issue which we have only implicitly indicated
this far. This is the issue that concerns the interpretation
of unacceptable though grammatical sentences and apparently
ungrammatical though obviously acceptable utterances. This
issue has been recently discussed by Smith N.V. (1981)
who concludes that with regard to the Interpretation of
tense "some constructions previously deemed ungrammatical
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were in fact grammatical even though frequently unacceptable,
and that other constructions previously deemed ungrammatical
even though acceptable should be reanalysed as grammatical"
(p.264).	 have already indicated how accurate this
observation is with regard to the interpretation of
utterances for aspect when we discussed especially event
and state VPs (Cf. 3.3 and 3.4).
We assume here therefore, that potentially the
interpretation of a typical reduplicated VP or its
utterance cannot be too different from that of its non-
reduplicated counterpart. As has been noted by Noravcsik
(1978) discussing "reduplicative constructions" in a
different context, that is, not with "aspect arid
quantification" in mind, the relationship between the
reduplicated VP and that of its non-reduplicated one is
that of proper inclusion. This means that reduplicated
VPs entail everything that their non-reduplicated VPs
entail (and a bit more besides) but not vice versa.
Generally however, the appropriate interpretation of
utterances with reduplicated VPs depends on both their
syntactic structure, their semantic content and especially
pragmatic factors (contexts etc.).
On these terms, it is clear that reduplicated
activity VPs and the utterances of which they are a part
potentially iterate the activity.
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,. %
	 - -	 - -
33. Y: ChWjabu a-ku-utuka-utuka lelo
- - -	
_ -C: Wjb). a-ku-tharnanga-thamanga lero
E: Wjabu is running (repeatedly/here and there) today
The first neutral interpretation of 33 is that the activity of
running performed by Wajabu is iterated. But 33 also implies
that there is something strange about Wajabu's repeated
running. Often it means that he does not usually run so
many times in a day or there is something uncomplimentary about
uttering 33. Note also that this interpretation is not too
dependent on the adverbial (i.e. "today"). If we did not
have this adverbial for instance, the sentence would still
be taken to vaguely refer to present time like "today". But
if we had a frequency adverbial like "these days" which
denotes more than one time, 33 would be interpreted
habitually; and the strangeness of Wajabu's activity would
therefore disappear.
Reduplicated accomplishment VPs expressed in sentences
like 34
- %	 %	 - -	 ••'	 •34. Y: Chevlajabu a-ku-utuka-utuka nah aganb mowa gano
%	 - -	 - -	 -C: %ajaou a-ku-thamanga-thamanga njaho masiku ano
E: Wajabu is repeatedly running the race these days
are taken to mean first that Wajabu runs the race almost as
a habit which has only just started. This interpretation is
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possible particularly because of the frequency adverbial
and again the singularity of the subject NP and the NP
"race". If we had an adverbial like "today" the appropriate
interpretation of the sentence would require some indication
of the context as certain races tend to be run only once per
day/season. The plurality of the subject NP would cause
the individuals participating in the race to multiply
accordingly. Note however, that in both these cases (33
and 34) the exact number of times that the activities or
the events are iterated is vague.
The interpretation of 34 does not apply to all cases
of accomplishment VPs however. Inchoatives like "mature"
or "ripen" induce different interpretation as can be seen
from 35:
- .	 •	 r	 - 4.
35. Y: P1 twa-iche, twa-simene yembe sili si-komle-
- -	
-	 *p -	
- - p -
C: Pamene ti-na-fika, ti-na-pez mango a-ta-psya-.
psyà
E: When we arrived, we found that the mangoes had
ripened
It is the ripening of each of the Inangoes which is meant in
35, rather than the repetition of the ripening for each of
the mangoes. This is so because the ripening of mangoes is
an event which takes place only once for each mango. This
explains also why the reduplicated inchoative VP will
generally not co-occur with a singular object NP. The only
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exception when an inchoative VP might be acceptable with a
singular NP like "mango" is in fiction or folk stories
where one mango might be said to "ripen" or "grow" many
times i.e. again the appropriate interpretation here is
provided by the context.
Similarly, achievement VPs which behave like
accomplishments i.e. those which are assumed to potentially
entail an end-point like "be born" are interpreted under-
standably as the accomplishment VP in 35. For the same
reason (that one's birth happens once only, except in
fairy stories etc.) 36 is generally unacceptable but
grammatical.
36. Y: ? Nwnch.'ji	 gá6
C: ? Mwn'y -k-bdw-bàdwà m'sk
E: ? The child is repeatedly being born these days
The only other possibly acceptable interpretation of 36 that
we can think of is when the "child" is taken representatively
to stand for a set or a type of "children" (as in the case
of a set of thalidomide children being born obviously
separately, within a certain stretch of time). Otherwise
36 is acceptable only after the NP in the subject position
is plural when it is interpreted as in 35.
As for the other kind of achievement VP, e.g. "flash",
"explode", "snap" which denote point-time as we indicated
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earlier, there is no problem of the interpretation of their
reduplicated form. The potentially dimensionless event
denoted by these VPs or the propositions which they might
partly express, is construed as being iterated definitely
or indefinitely as the case may be or according to the
context. This won't need illustrating.
What might need some mention is the construal of
sentences with a reduplicated state VP. As we Indicated
in 3.3, progressive states are interpreted Iteratively or
as signalling gradually developing iterated states.
37. Y:	 msgw kts'kCi
m6'a gan6
%	 % - -. %	 - % .. - _C: Ndi-ku-mva-imva phokoso kunja'ku rnasiku an
E: I am hearing noises outside these days
The hearing in 37 is interpreted iteratively not only
because of the influence of the plural NP (noises) or the
presence of the frequency adverbial (these days) but mostly
because the reduplicated VP is stative.
Even VPs which intrinsically denote iteration, as
we briefly sketched, can also be reduplicated. This is
exemplified by 38:
- -	 - - _%	 % % %	 % __._ - -38. Y: Lulo li-ku-sulula-sulula agano mowa gano
-C: Ntsuko u-ku-kha-ikha masiku an
E: The jar Is repeatedly leaking these days
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The least confusing way of indicating the interpretation of
38 whose VP already encodes iteration might be by representing
the sentence graphically thus:
39. - - a a —	
— — — — — -+
to	ti	 t2	 t3
This is in opposition to the meaning of sentence 40.
%40. Y: Lal' l-ki-s 'ltfl. 	gano mowa gn6
-	 -. 'C: Ntsk -ku-kha masiku ano
E: The jar is leaking (leaks) these days
whose non-reduplicated VP encodes iteration which might be
graphically represented as 41:
41. .----
Each dash in 39 and 41 is a simplified representation of one
drop; but whereas the four dashes are arbitrarily meant to
stand for the number of times the drops fall i.e. Indefinitely
in 41, each set of four drops is repeated four times i.e. t0...t3
and indefinitely in 39. Clearly the differences between the
interpretation of the iteration in 38 and that of 40 Is
difficult to arrive at because of the unspecified number of
times which the VPs (reduplicated or not) denote. In both
cases the leaking can be differently interpreted for example,
as being either continuous, where no gaps between the drops
-86-.
(dashes) say, are discernible (unlike in 39 and 41) or as
being iterative with short or long intervaisbetween the
drops (dashes) or set of drops, as is represented by 39
and 41. Other differences in interpretation will tend
to be resolved by either linguistic or non-linguistic
contexts.
The following concluding remarks might not be out
of order therefore regarding the interpretation of iterative
utterances. Iterated VPs appearing in utterances might
express not only the repeated occurrence of the events,
states or activities which they describe, they might also
express their persisting occurrence which need not be
iteratively interpreted. Often where a non-reduplicated
VP might express a neutrally described notion, its
reduplicated form might denote the opposite notion (e.g.
it might be pejorative, Cf. 33, Wajabu's "repeated running"
above).	 Also, reduplicated VPs or the sentences in which
they might appear, are always unspecific as to the exact
number of times that the event, state, activity is iterated.
This general vagueness is often linguistically resolved by
NPs or adverbials with which the VPs might occur. Otherwise
it is pragmatically resolved along the lines indicated in
the final chapter.
Finally, according to the tradition adopted in this
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chapter this far, we might represent an iterative
(reduplicated or not) VP (ITER) as denoting the number n,
of times t, which may be specific ESPE as in the case of
a VP like "blink" or unspecific [UNSPE] for all other cases,
as in 42:
42. VP -	
t	
PEC31
(ITER)	 )NSPEJJ
42 claims that an iterative VP denotes either a specific
or an unspecific number of times in which the event described
takes place.
3.6 The time schemata encoded in temporal adverbials
So far we have only indicated that VPs in the four
categories can co-occur or fail to occur with specific
temporal adverbials. It is clear however, that the
temporal concepts inherent in VPs which we have just
indicated are also encoded in these adverbials. The
relation between aspect and temporal adverbials has been
noted in the literature before (Cf. Nilsen, 1972, and others).
Not only do VPs and ADVs often denote similar concepts of
time but in fact, this is the reason why a language which
might not express certain concepts morpho-phoriologically
may do so through their VPs and/or adverbials (Cf. the
point which Dubs made about the expression of time In
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Chinese; see particularly also the study of aspect in
Chinese by Neichert, 1980). Without wanting to dwell
too long on this point, we give below some temporal
ad.verbials which appear to be relevant for the description
of aspect.
43. Y: p t(n klbk C: p tnr klk'b E: at ten o'clock
-
kndwi	 m'm'w	 in the morning
- %
maola gawili	 maoia awili
	
(for) two hours
m6 g6sp	 msik ns	 everyday
- -.. -	 - -
ndawi jsp
	
nthawi zonse	 always
ls	 dzi1	 yesterday
-	 - -pi-wajl'-g(	 pamene a-ma-pi.a while he was going
-
-nkna-jaule	 a-sana-pie	 before he went
- -
pi-wa-pite	 a-ta-pita	 after he went
' -kainodzi-km6dz	 once in a while
It is clear from 43 that ADVs have temporal features
which characterize VPs. For example, "at ten o'clock" is
instantaneous. "in the morning" is durative or expresses
an interval of time which has boundaries or closure; as
does the deictic "yesterday". The time encoded in "always"
is characteristically "indefinite", "enduring" or "continuous" -
it might even have gaps. "while" emphasizes the medial
process of an activity, event or state. "before" and "after"
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emphasize the initial and final points of a given activity,
event or state. And finally, "everyday" and "once in a
while" denote the frequency or iteration of the events,
activities or states that they describe.
The point we would like to stress Is that certain
temporal ADVs encode aspectual concepts that would be
morphologically marked in Slavic. And representing these
concepts within the tradition we develop here as 4.4 is
therefore not being too far-fetched about how we interpret
aspect.
t NST]
CNC
44.	 ADV
	
jNDE)
(ASP)	 NDU3
44. claims that certain adverbials can be interpreted as
inherently signalling such concepts as instantaneity,
inceDtion, indefiniteness, enduring time, iteration etc.
3,7 Aspectual marking in Yao and Chea
We have sufficiently argued and demonstrated this far
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that VPs, ADVs and implicitly NPs (i.e. by their singularity
and plurality) encode temporal concepts which Slavonic
linguists have always associated with "verbal aspect":
concepts such as inception, completion, resumption,
habituality, continuity, iteration etc 0 There are also
morphological items in Yao and Chea which might be
accurately referred to as marking some of these concepts.
This section is devoted to a brief discussion of some of
these.
3.7.1 The iterative suffix in Yao : -j
We concluded section 3.5 with a discussion of iteration
denoted by verbal reduplication among other forms. We start
this section with what might be called the "iterative marker"
which is peculiar to Yao alone. No equivalent marker appears
in Che*a to our knowledge. And this marker (-nya) applies
only to a small group of achievement VPs which, we suspect,
might not be more than a score in number altogether. The
following is a random sample:
5. -temangul
-pwatika
#
-uta
- _
-kata
,	 -
-pinda
-
-mata
(break)
(patch)
(pull)
(cut)
(bend/
fold)
(glue!
patch)
-trna'ngTh-ny
-pwft!k-ny
-iit-ny
-k t-ny
-pinda-nya
- -
-mata-nya
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-pnd	 (stamp foot on) -p6nd-ny
-j6ngl	 (stretch)	 -jngl-.ny
- -
-lokota	 (pick up)	 -lt-ny
-'	 S
-puola	 (piece/bore)	 -poola-nya
-pp1	 (tear)	 -ppl-ny
Obviously one way of signalling iteration for the
VPs in 45 is reduplication as we have seen in 3.5. On
these terms	 means "break many times
or into many pieces". But it is not necessary to
reduplicate this set of VPs. "-nya" sufficiently performs
this function as is indicated by the second section of the
-. -VPs in 45. -teniangu a-nya has the same meaning as
And this goes for all the other
VPs in 45. And to indicate that the item in question is
broken into even smaller and smaller pieces or many more
times, the new VP marked by -nya might also be reduplicated
thus:	 which often means "to
break beyond recognition of the original shape of the item".
And this also goes for all the other VPs in 45.
However, as we have consistently indicated, when the
iterative marker is suffixed to the verb root as in 45,
what is important is the meaning that this suffixation
signals. This is particularly true for VPs like "itd'-ny",
.	 % .4	 e	 .4	 S
"jongola-riya", "pinda-nya" and others. The VP "uta-nya"
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predicated over an. item like "iron" as in:
- - •r
	 - - %Lf6. Y: Ch.syano chila a-gambile ku-chi-uta-nya
-	 -	 ..% %	 %.	 1•	 •*	 •• -C: Chitsulo chija a-ngo-chi-koka-koka
E: The iron has just been pulled apart
does not directly emphasize the number of times the iron
has been pulled apart or out. The meaning of 46 Y
(and 46 C) is that the iron has been straightened to the
point that its original shape (which was somehow crooked
or round etc) is unknown. Similarly, k 't-ny or its
reduplicated form	 only remotely
resembles its original VP -kata (cut) in meaning; for
these new VPs mean "mince" or sometimes "grind". In these
cases, the number of times encoded in the VPs is only
obliquely referred to. And 47:
	
- -.. .'	 .	 -47. Y: Chevajabu a-gambile ku-li-pinda-nya
	
%	 S	 - d S eC: Wa3abu wa-ngo-dzi-pinda-pinda
E: Wajabu has folded himself several times
is a pejorative way of describing Wajabu's way of sleeping:
he folds himself, more than double, as it were. All these
interpretations fit in with what we have said about
reduplicated VPs: the iterated item may not signal the
same meaning exactly signalled by the non-iterated VP
(whether iteration is intrinsic , bY reduplication or by
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suffixation); arid the number of times is unspecific
and might be indefinite.
3.7.2 The progressive marker in Yao and Chea : -ku-
In both Yao and Chea continuity or progressivity is
morphologically marked by the same element -ku-. Traditional
descriptions consider -ku- either as an infinitive marker
or the marker of present continuous tense. It might be
more accurate however, to consider -ku- as marking
imperfectivity which subsumes the continuous or progressive
aspect. Those grammarians who take this affix as a marker
of "tense" rather than aspect, cannot however, be so easily
dismissed. As we indicate in the next chapter tense has to
be understood as the way in which temporal schemata which
characterize aspect (e.g. continuity, completion, inception,
resumption etc.) are related to each other sequentially or
are anchored to speech time (or both). Naturally, if the
continuous marker -ku- in both languages is anchored to
speech time, by being simultaneous to It that is, the
continuousness thus signalled will tend to be associated with
the speech time or present time. Strictly speaking then,
-ku- signals imperfective aspect (continuity) or a process
that goes on in time, which need not be taken as
simultaneous with the speech time of an utterance.
As we indicated, the activity VP poses no problem with
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its co-occurrence with this progressive marked (Cf. 3.2.1
above). In all cases where -ku- appears, the progress or
the process of the activity, event or state is emphasized,
either continuously for activities or iteratively for pure
achievements and states and either continuously or
iteratively for inchoatives. These facts have already
been illustrated. We might just repeat that -ku goes
with statives as well as other VPs; and what we suggested
about the interpretation of sentence 14 and 15 above applies.
So entailment rule 25 applies to event VPs or fails to
apply as the case may be.
3.7.3 The habitual marker in Yao and Chea: -ku- + sa ; -ma
Habituality is morphologically marked in Yao and Chea.
In Chea -ma- sufficiently marks it when it occupies the
position often occupied by the progressive marker -ku-
i.e. after the subject prefix (ti-) and before the verb
root (-thamanga) as in 48 C (though sometimes -ma- can
co-occur with -ku.-).
...	 .. % % 1%48. Y: tu-ku-.sa-utuka
-C: ti-ma-thamanga
E: we (always) run
As we can deduce from 48 Y however, Yao expresses habituality
not only by the traditionally assumed habitual marker -sa-
(Cf. Sanderson, 1922; Whitely, 1966), but almost always in
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modern idiomatic Yao,in the context of the progressive
marker -ku-. And this is true of VPs from all the four
verbal categories, as we might expect. The usual apparently
bothersome categories are those we have already seen. VPs
like "be born" which denote an event which happens only
once are interpreted differently, i.e. as in contexts of
"fairy stories" where a singular subject NP Is concerned.
Inchoative and stat.ive VPs might appear to present a problem
in the interpretation of their habituality as well.
_ - l• -	 - -49. Y: Yembe si-ku-sa-komala
- -C: Mango a-ma-psya
E: Mangoes (always) ripen
-	
--50. Y: ti-ku-sa-pikana
C: ti-m-mv'
E: we (always) hear
49 and 50 are partly vague (Cf. Smith, C.S., 1977) without
adverbials and noun phrases that might bring in specificity.
50 means that we hear habitually; and 49 that rnangoes ripen
as a habit (which is obvious). Alternatively, these
sentences express the "ability to V"; that is, they also
express the natural characteristics of mangoes or "our"
characteristic as human beings to "hear". We pick up this
point below.
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3.7.4 The stative marker in Yao: -ku- + V +ga
Yao also has what is traditionally referred to as an
iterative marker -ga, which we suggest, be considered
instead as a "stative marker". And like -sa- it always
goes with -ku or in certain cases with -sa- itself or
with both -ku and -sa-.
-..	 .	 -	 -	 -	 •	 %.% -51. Y: Ch6wajabu wa-ku-lya-ga ma1jani.
- 4	 - p•C: Wa3abu a-m-dya anyani
E: Wa,jabu eats monkeys
We assume from the Interpretation of 51 that it is not
only a habit of Wajabu's to eat monkeys, but he Is as
it were, characterized by this fact. This is also true
of 52:
__.4 4.
	 4. 4.	 4.	 - •4. 4.52. Y: Cheaabu a-ku-sa-lya-ga inajani
.' P 4.	 4.	 .C: Wa3abu a-m-dya anyani
E: Wajabu eats monkeys
With accomplishment and achievement VPs (i.e. event VPs),
what Is also emphasized is the "ability to V which is
denoted when "ku + V -ga" appear. On closer examination
of the VP categories however, we suggest that what is
central to all the interpretations this far is that these
two markers in combination have the major function of
signalling stativity. The habitual characteristic which
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is denoted by the two markers is such that it generally
"endures" for the rest of the relevant time-span involved.
This is why it might be more accurate to call ku- + V - ga"
in Yao a stative marker.
3.7.5 The continuative marker in Yao and Che'a: -pe, -be
Finally, we indicate two suffixes which signal
continuity of the event or state or activity in the same
way that the temporal adverbial "still" does in English.
- - 
.% %	 '	 -53. Y: CheWajaou a-na-nku-lya-pe
C: Wa,jabu a-k-dy(-b
E: Wajabu is still eating
It is clear from the interpretation of' 53 that the action
started sometime back and is continuing, This inter-
pretation is possible because of both the progressive
marker, which directs the process to the speech time of
the event and the continuative morphological marker
"-pe" and "-be" (note that the "-na-" in the Yao sentence
behaves like the verb "to be" in English). Again this
interpretation is true generally of all the VP categories;
i.e. the activity, state, event etc. is normally assumed
to have started earlier than the speech time and is
expected to continue beyond it.
In conclusion, let us say this: that we intended to
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indicate the nature of aspectual marking in Yao and Chea
in these five sections. Obviously, this sketchy picture
could be amplified by a brief examination of what goes on
when VPs or morphological markers appear with items from
other categories such as noun phrases and adverbials. In
the next section, we should like to briefly and rather
informally indicate how aspect might be interpreted in
these linguistic contexts, clearing the ground for its
treatment in extra linguistic contexts as we propose to
do in the final chapter.
3.8 The sentential interpretation of aspect in Yao and Chea
We devote a few paragraphs below to indicating how a
fuller picture of what constitutes aspect might be obtained
when we treat VPs, AIDVs, and markers in the context of each
other. This chapter in fact, has already indicated in
passing how a change of the linguistic context in which a
VP appears (i.e. how the addition of an adverbial in an
utterance) might induce interpretation of the utterance which
is different from that denoted originally by the VP. Here we
take only a few cases to underline the fact that even before
we seek model-theoretic treatments of some of the problems of
the vagueness of interpretation of some utterances, other
linguistic solutions can reduce the number of problems in
questions
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. %	 •p	 - -54. Y: Ltayala lila li-ku-uluca
.m f -C: Taly lij l'1-1ci-phulika
E: The tyre is exploding
We noted earlier that the proposition expressed by an
achievement utterance as in 54 does not suggest the truth
of its "perfect" counterpart i.e. "the tyre has exploded".
At least initially, the "perfect" utterance is not
deducible from 54. In other words, whereas with
progressive activity VPs or the proposition they partly
express, the "perfect" entailment was logically necessary,
this is not the case with event VPs. This does not mean
that they are necessarily incompatible or unacceptable
however, given an appropriate context. In 55 for example,
' -- _%55. Y: Matayala ga-la ga-ku-ulika
,.	 -	 % S .5	 %	 SC: Iviatayala a-Ja a-ku-phulika
E: The tyres are exploding
the proposition expressed by the utterance in its "perfect"
form as in 56 is compatible or acceptable.
- S56. Y: Nat'yl ga-uliche
S	 - •C: Ntyl a-phulika
E: Tyres have exploded
- i 00-
The plurality of the NP in 56 in part obviously enhances
this compatibility or acceptability. That is, although
the plurality of the NP in 55 does not make the "perfect"
counterpart in 56 "logically necessary", it certainly
makes it more compatible or acceptable. Again the
distinction between grammaticality and acceptability
(or its resolution in context) comes into play here.
Turn now to a sentence like 57:
S	 S	 4.-
57. Y: Litayala lila li-ku-ulika-ulika agano mowa gano
4• ..	 s--, - % -C: Tyl lj li-k1-phlika-phu.iiKa inasiku ano
E: The tyre is frequently exploding these days
57 is acceptable not only because of the reduplicated VP
but also because of the frequency adverbial with which it
occurs. In this case however, the number of times that
the tyre explodes is vague. In some cases (even before
we appeal to pragmatic factors of extra linguistic context)
other adverbials could resolve this vagueness.
S -' %	 S -	 ' .S -	 -	 "58. Y: Litayala lila li-ku-ulika-ulika kamo pa lyuwa
gnb m6 gn
C: Tyi'a
	
	 k&in6dzr p
tsik msikti
E: The tyre is (?frequently) exploding once a
day these days
The habituality which might have been denoted in 57 is
partly curtailed by the more specific adverbial "once a day",
-101-
signalling larger gaps between the iterated explosions
of the tyre.
The use of this achievement VP with 5nother achievement
VP might reveal other facts about how these categories or
markers influence each other in linguistic contexts. Take
59 for example.
-
59. Y: Ltyl ll l-tnd1e ku-ulika
,%C: Taiayaia itj l-ymbà k-philik
E: The tyre has started to explode/exploding
In the interpretation of 59, the problem of the non-
applicability of the entailment rule 25 raises its head
again. But as is frequently noted in the literature
(Cf. Mittwoch, 1980) 59 is meaningful in contexts like
when we are watching a slow motion film concerning the
explosion of a tyre and we are noting the exact moment
when the tyre might be said to have started exploding.
Otherwise, only the plurality of the NP "tyre" might
save 59. This argument applies also for the use of these
VPs with other"aspectua]. VPs" (Cf. Freed, 1979) like
"resume", "end" etc.
Similarly, the irtherent temporal structure for
morphological markers of aspect is influenced by the
semantic content of the NPs, ADVs and other items with
which they might appear in utterances. We will not give
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too many examples as the point is sufficiently made now.
- S	 I60. Y: Litayala'lo li-ku-sa-ulika-ga aino ndawi jin
g6'sp
C: Tl'l lr-m-phl!k nthw ri6'y msk
6nsd
E: The tyre explodes at about this time everyday
60 expresses an event which is not only repeated sufficiently
enough to become habitual but the morphological markers
combine with the temporal adverbial and the singular NP
to signal the expected (almost scheduled) explosion of the
tyre.
.For the same reason, a sentence like 61 is more
specifically interpreted because of the presence of the
adverbial "once a day".
-	
, _ -
	 S	 % - #_% S61. Y: T-ku-sa-p1l1kcana masegwe kamo pa lyuwa agano
._ - -
mowa gano
v'C: Ti-ma-mva phk6sd kmc5iz p tsIk msk n?
E: We hear the noise once a day these days
The "hearing" wbich might have been interpreted as
habituality in the context of the habitual marker and the
frequency adverbial "these days", now adjusts its
interpretation to that of "iterative" habituality.
In conclusion, we only intended to give the feel of
the linguistic contexts which influence the interpretation
of aspectual markers, VPs and NPs. We did not aim at
being exhaustive in our treatment. We hope to have
sufficiently shown that a fuller picture on the
interpretation of aspect emerges after we have treated
this category sententially or "quasi-lexically" or in
its linguistic contexts. At this level, we are forced
to consider the total temporal structure encoded by the
combination of the various morphological and lexical
items which constitute the utterance. It is this fact
which constitutes a part of the meaning of the
"compositionality principle" assumed to be central to
model-theoretic treatments of aspect and tense to which
we turn briefly later.
3.9	 Conclusion
Any cross-linguistic interpretation or description
of a category like aspect involves the identification of
features which are as it were, "universal" to the languages
concerned and those which are "particular". This chapter
noted such particular features as the existence of the
iterative marker in Yao and its absence in Chea and
English. The presence in Yao and Chea of habitual
markers and its absence in English. The limitless use
of the progressive marker in Yao and Cbea and its use
with non-stative VPs generally in English. The particular
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features however, tend to be almost invariably
morphological or lexical (i.e. generally not concerned
with differences of the concepts which they denote). We
hope to have sufficiently demonstrated therefore, that the
cross-linguistic interpretation o± aspect involves the
knowledge or identification of intrinsic temporal schemata
which are inherent in morphological markers, VPs, ADVs, NPs
and the constructions or utterances in which they figure.
We hope to have sufficiently indicated that where VPs
and markers in isolation induce temporal vagueness (or
ambiguity) of reference of the utterances in question,
linguistic contexts (i.e. the provision of an appropriate
adverbial or an NP) might resolve the problem.
There are utterances like 62 however, which, to all
intents and purposes, still remain indeterminate in what
they refer to.
S	 ', .. .562. Y: Ch6Wjabu a-wile-je ls lig]^
-C: WSjbi -m(-f( dzl madzulo
E: Viajabu was dying yesterday evening
It is not clear from 62 whether Wajabu's death was planned
to take place yesterday; or that 62 describes a death that
took place yesterday; or that they (whoever they might be)
were only remembering or celebrating his death which took
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place on a day like yesterday; or that Wajabu was about
to die yesterday but the doctors saved him etc. Each of
these is a 9potential" linguistic context (i.e. adverbia].s
and other lexical items might be found to determine the
interpretation) which could be used to indicate the
appropriate interpretation of 62; but often the choice of
the aporopriate interpretation is dependent on extra-
linguistic (pragmatic) factors. It is with an exploration
of these that the rest of this study will occupy itself.
Let us first however, turn to a discussion of tense in
Yao, Chea and English.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1. The view we hold on the matter as is apparent later
in this chapter is that the progressive operator (marker)
in Yao and Chea (i.e. -ku- for both languages) marks
continuous/progressive aspect (or imperfectivity generally).
-ku- is traditionally considered to mark tense only because
the process it signals tends to be anchored to the speech
-time (Cf. Reichenbach, 1947, and followers) of the
utterance in question.
2. In these cases, we suppose for the sake of argument,
that Wajabu collapses after one hour or one second of being
declared ruler, assuming that one begins to rule at the stroke
of the time one is so declared.
3. It is clear that Kenny, Mourelatos and others are
correct when they group particularly those accomplishment
and achievement VPs which denote the end-point of the events
they describe as "performances" or "events", reducing the
VP categories to only three. Sut we do not reject Vendler's
four categories because achievement \TPs like "flash", "explode",
"snap", "burst" etc. cannot be accurately referred to as
denoting an end-point to the same extent that "draw a
circle" or "reach the hill-top" do. We consider the former
VPs (e.g. "flash" etc.) as "pure" achievements, thereby
justfying Vendler's four categories of VPs.
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4. Clearly VPs like "twitch" and "dribble" are semantically
different especially in the context of frequency adverbials.
"twitch" + frequency AIJV = either several twitches or one
"bout of twitching";
"dribble" + frequency ADV = "two bouts of' dribbling".
5. The progressive or continuous aspect can also be
expressed by a combination of what might be referred to as
the "verb to be" equivalent in Yao and Chea (happily -lj
for both languages) with the imperfective marker -- as in:
.	 ..(a) Y: t .-1 mk-ianga chitabu
,.C:	 k-w'rng bCk
E: we are reading a book
Although we assume below that the sentences take the form of
(b) subject prefix + tense/ aspect pref + verb root
tu	 +	 ku	 + walanga
ti	 +	 ku	 + werenga
we	 asp/prog	 + read
there are other forms like those in (a) above which exist.
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CHAPTER FOUR
TENSE MARKERS, DEICTIC AIJVERBIALS AND TIME INTERPRETATION
IN YAO, CHE'A AND ENGLISH UTTERANCES
4.0 Introduction
We start this chapter on the assumption demonstrated
in the last chapter, that to understand tense more fully
cross-linguistically, we must treat this category above all
sententially. That is, although tense is largely gramma -
ticalised in Yao and Che'a to an extent which aspect is not,
it is understood better when we examine how the temporal
notions of past, present and future denoted by tense markers are
modified in contexts of deictic adverbials and in whole
utterances • 1
That utterances with tense markers but outside the
context of deictic adverbials with which they naturally
co-occur, are generally vague has been amply illustrated
by Smith C.S. (1977, 1978, 1981) and others. And the
recent work on tense (Cf. Hornstein, 1977; Smith C.S.,
ibid.; Comrie, 1981b; Wachtel, 1982 and many others)
based on Reichenbach (1947) indicates that the appropriate
Interpretation of tense in utterances involves more than
knowledge o± the morphological, lexical or sentential
markers of past, present and future time, We look briefly
at the Reichenb 5 chian treatment of tense and indicate
that this model is clearly superior to the traditional
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treatments of tense. Reichenbach proposes a semantic
treatment of tense based on three temporal primitives:
the moment of speech (s), the moment of the event (E),
and the presence of some other reference time (R) which,
however, is not necessary in certain constructions (Cf.
NcGilvray, 1974 and Comrie, 1981b). The appropriate
interpretation of tense given these three temporal
primitives, revolves around the structuring of the
primitives E and R according to whether or not they
are anterior to, posterior to, or simultaneous with
the speech time S
On the basis of Reichenbach's system, we attempt
a unified treatment of tense and aspect, (though one
which is in part different from that of for example,
Johnson, 1977, 1981 etc.). We take tense to be orthogonal
to aspect and provide a list of sentences indicating
the ordering of the three temporal primitives CS, E arxd/
or R) with the aim of indicating how the Reichenbachian
interpretation of tense works. Given the temporal
structure indicated in the previous chapter for the
interpretation of aspect, the treatment of aspect and
tense at right-angles to each other as we indicate here,
should not come as a surprise. It is in fact, implicit
in Reichenbach's own treatment of progressive and
iterative forms of events.	 -
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But, as might be expected, no theoretical frame-
work is foolproof. Limitations of the Reichenbacian
treatment exist as has been pointed out by linguists
such as NcGilvray (1974), Comrie (1981b), Wachtel
(1982) and others.The limitations concern on the one
hand the interpretation of sentences which have
different morpho-syntactic structure, but are claimed
to have one meaning; and on the other, the case where
one (utterance of a) sentence is claimed to have more
than one meaning. We note that these limitations do not
necessarily vitiate the semantic treatment proposed by
Reichenbach and his followers, but that the pragmatic
interpretation which is in part a function of the
ordering of the three temporal primitives might need
expanding, along the lines proposed in the final chapter.
We start this chapter however, by illustrating with a
few typical examples how tense is morphologically and
lexically marked in Yao and Chea.
4.1 The morphological and lexical marking of tense
Both traditional and more recent descriptions of
tense in Yao (Sanderson, 1922; Whiteley, 1966) and Che*a
(Watkins, 1937; Price, 1962) as well as English (Cf.
Quirk et al., 1972) and others are largely concerned
with the discovery of the morphological markers (affixes)
which denote past, present, and future time. Clearly,
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the knowledge of these markers constitutes the starting
point for the interpretation of tense in utterances.
In some cases the appropriate construal of tense is
provided when we treat these markers in the context
of deictic adverbials; in yet others, when we treat
them extra-linguistically. The following sections demonstrate
these claims informally.
4,1.1 The interpretation of present time markers
Let us start by a brief discussion of what is
traditionally referred to as the 'tpresent continuous tense".
In the last chapter, we indicated that the affix -ku--
can be used to refer to either "tense" or "aspect".
We claimed that it does not matter whether we take this
marker and Its English equivalent as expressed by the
various forms of the verb "to be + V -Ing" as tense or
aspect, as long as we are aware of the different
interpretations attached to each usage. When we utter I
1.Y: th-k-^tiik
'4	 -C: ti - ku - thamanga
E: we are running
for example, if our emphasis is on the progressivity of
the activity of running, we are talking about aspect;
but if we relate this progressivity to the speech time
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of the utterance (Cf. Reichenbach, 191i7, below), we
are talking about tense. The correct interpretation
of the morphology is here neutral as between the two,
and the literature (Cf. Quirk et al., 1972) confirms this.
Supposing we say that -ku- and its English equivalent
forms signal present time, which happens to be interpreted
as being simultaneous with the speech time of the utterance.
We still have to grapple with the appropriate inter -
pretation of this simultaneity. 2 For instance, an utterance
such as I with an activity VP and the progressive marker
-ku- will tend to signal a speech time which is properly
included within the temporal stretch of the process. For
utterances with event VPs as in 2 below,
- // , , , ,'2. Y: th-ku-ika penani pala
..	 '	 ,'-	 ..	 I	 IC: ti-ku-fika pamwamba paj
E: we are reaching the hill top
the speech time of the utterance is included within the
temporal stretch of the event denoted by the VP "reaching
the bill top", although there is no guarantee that this
end-point will necessarily be reached. Technically the
end-point of the event and the moment when the utterance
stops are supposed to overlap completely for the
simultaneity to be clearly understood.
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What we called "pure t' achievements as in 3 are
interpreted differently however.
3. Y: LItyàlà i1i lI-ki-l^kI
C: TSyl lIj. li-k-phi1l^k
E: The tyre is exploding
It is generally assumed that the tyre will explode immediately
after the speech time of the utterance, although its
explosion before the end-point of the speech time of the
utterance is not necessarily excluded, i.e. in 3 the tyre
can explode immediately before or after the utterance
has been made or at the exact time when the utterance
stops.
Similarly, the interpretation of stative VPs with
-ku- as in 4 below, has a special character about it which
pertains to the "enduring" nature of such constituents.
-	 -	
%.	 S.	 -	 -	 ,	 .'4. Y: Ligombo'li li-ku-nonyela kwa nnopè
C: Nth6ch^'yI ndI-ki-. fk6'ndI kwmbi'r.
E: I am loving this banana a lot
Here, speech time is not only properly included in the
temporal stretch denoted by the process of banana loving
(as with the interpretation of activity utterances) but
we expect the temporal stretch of the "loving" to go
beyond the speech time. Above all, 4 is interpreted as
we interpreted those inchoative progressives which have
no gaps (Cf. the claim in chapter three). We have
sufficiently shown then, that the "aspectual" marker
-ku- can be used as a "tense" marker 0 We have also
indicated that the interpretation of the simultaneity
of the speech time with the event time (in our terms,
events will be taken to subsume activities and states
as well) depends on the VP category,
Another way of indicating how we interpret these
markers can best be seen when we treat utterances as in
I - 1 in the context of deictic adverbials, Cf. (5):
'	 / l	 %	 %	 -
5. Y: tu-ku-utuka sambano jino
C: tI-ki-thmng ts6pàn6 11n6
E: we are running right now
As we noted in the previous chapter, the temporal structure
denoted by VPs or indicated by morphological markers,
could also be denoted by ADVs and other categories. This
is one way of getting clearly the interpretation we
offered in I - 4 above i.e. by locating the utterance
time within the time of a deiCtic temporal adverbial
such as "nOW" etc... As we know, there are other temporal
adverbials which refer to the present time. The following
is a short representative list:
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6.Y:srnbnô jIn6
àjin6 ndi
/5 /	 I-C: tsopani lino
-_ •S t
nthawi mo
E:right now
this time
pàngk'p
/ - /t
moVa gosope
m6 gn6
,	 ,.	 , ..
ndIkulankhula'p
p6sâchdwà 'p
.,_\	 -	 -
màsiku onse
msk àn
as I speak
(Just) recently
everyday
these days
Given the interpretation we have provided for the
use of -ku- and its English equivalents, we can see that
each of the ADVs in 6 will affect the interpretation
of the previous utterances accordingly. If we take sentence
3 and add the adverbial "these days" as in 7 below:
. /	 '	 % '	 .	 - - / '.	 ,	 - ,7.Y:Litayàla lila li-ku-ulika agano m6a gano
-	 %	 S
	C:Tayàla	 li-ku-phulika mas^ku ano
E:The tyre is exploding these days
for example, we no longer have any doubts as to whether
the explosion is coincident with or comes before or after
the speech time of the utterance ( as was the case with
the interpretation of 3). 7 conveys the frequency of the
explosion of the tyre. In other words, the deictic
adverbials in 6 will tend to overwhelm the "original"
meaning of 3 or rather emphasise the frequency of this
original meaning. Different adverbials will naturally
signal different interpretalons of the utterances with
which the VPs plus -ku- or its English equivalents
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might appear. The temporal meaning denoted by the "present"
affixes may also be modified in the context of other
deictic adverbials. The examples in 8 and 9 show how.
8. Y:	 mgiI
- / .1	 #C: ti-ku-tharnanga mawa
E; we are running tomorrow
'	 '	 ''	 #• '
	 % '.	 / ,	 s -9. Y: Nnungu umasile'u tut*teje tu-ku-utuka liso
(week last this we said we
	 run yesterday)
%	 .1	 %	 \ I	 I .	 -C:Mlungu watha"wu timati ti-ku-thamanga dzulo
(week last this we said we run yesterday)
E:Last week we said we were running yesterday
Note particularly in Yao and Chea how the adverbial
changes the "original" meaning of the utterances in 8
and 9 causing them to refer to the future or the past time
of the event respectively.
The point we would like to stress with regard to
the interpretation of the so-called present continuous
tense marker is that the situation where this marker
has the force of either tense or aspect is not new.
Both traditional and recent work on the subject note
it. (Cf. Quirk et al. Ibid; and Comrie, 1976, especially
chapter 5) The way we interpret these markers in
utterances depends therefore on the kind of temporal
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adverbial with which they occur, i.e. some are deictic
others are not and this affects the choice of aspect or
tense as the intended interpretation,.
There is a further type of present, referred to as
the "narrativ&' present, which requires some mention.
In English this is represented by the suffix -s (or -es),
or sometimes zero, attached to the verb. In Yao and
Chea this usage is indicated when the subject prefix,
which is usually attached to the marker -4cu- or the
verb root, is absent. The point is best illustrated
given a series of VPs used to descrLbe the narrated
event as in 10:
,•	 _ •	 '	 - '	 •	 %	 -10. Y: CheWajabu ku-p6chela mpIla, ku-lisya
nj6mb, nè kw-p6l Keegan
C: Wjbi k-1indrl rnp'Ir, ki-dyts
-
nj?mb, ndi ku-patsila Keegan
E: Wajabu gets the ball, dribbles, and
passes to Keegan
Generally however, the narrative present is expressed
when the subject prefix is attached to the verb root
without an intervening prefix -ku-i in the case of Chea
and with -ku- for Yao as in 11.
-.118-
-	 .. .-	 -	 -	 p11. Y: ChéWajabu a-ku-pochela xnp'Ila
C: Wjbti	 xnpIrh
E: Wajabu gets the ball
The "unrestricted use" of the present tense (Cf.
Leech, 1971) also sometimes referred to as the "generic"
use, is expressed in Che*a and English by the use of
the so-called "copula" and by zero in Yao, as in 12.
12. Y: L1n lyngi Wjàbi
C: DzIn la'ng ndi WIjbi
E: My name is Wajabu
Proverbial expressions which denote the timelessness
of the situations which they describe, are also generally
thus expressed.
We might note finally the habitual present marker,
which is really an aspectual marker as we saw in the
last chapter, and is"present" only because It behaves
like the -ku- which we have just discussed. When -ma--
for Che'a and -sa- + V + (-a) for Yao are used to
express a form of habituality which might be said to be
simultaneous with the speech time, that is, when the
speech time is located in the"timelessness" of the event,
the notion of habitual present might be justified. Each
of the examples we provided In the previous chapter will
stand as an illustration,
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We might just underline the claim of this section
for the interpretation of present tense general1y
assuming a quasi-Reichenbachian definition of present
tense as simultaneity of the speech time with the event
time(Cf. below for an exposition of these notions), we
can claim that -ku- marks present tense on its owns But
following Smith C.S. (1977) such sentences (with tense
markers like -
	
) are generally vague in isolation.
The time which they signal is understood better when
they co-occur with appropriate deictic temporal adverbials.
These in turn depend in part on the category of the VPs0
4,1.2 The interpretation of past time markers
The general marker of past time in Che'ta is -na-
or its variant -da- • In Yao however, it is common to
assume that the past is marked first by the verb root
being put into the subjunctive form and then having the
subject prefix (which must have -a as its final vowel)
attached to it.In English past time is of course, marked
by -ed for "regular" verbs, or by sundry variants otherwise.
13 exemplifies these facts.
13. Y: ChWjbti â-iièj ngtiki 11s6
C: Wa'jàbi -ni-ph( nkhkx dzil
E: Wajabu killed a chicken yesterday
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On these terms, Chea and English probably have the
easier and more consistent way of marking past time
than Yao, i.e. Yao is less predictable. Yao's morpho-
logical form of past tense is dependent on other factors
- which we simplify here and lump together as being
"subjunctive factors". 3The facts can be illustrated as
in 14.
14. Y: simple verb root
- _\
-ulaga
_tmahgiâ
- _
-utuka
- -
-sala
-. ,
-iecheta
subjunctive form
-ijè	 (kill)
-tem(ngwIl (break)
-twfch	 (run )
.
-sasile	 (say)
-chgt	 (speak)
(For a fuller morphological treatment of these data refer
to Sanderson, 1922; and especially 1Mteley, 1966). It we
assume that the subject prefix for an NP like Wajabu is
wa and that in the first person plural tu- becomes
twa- etc., we can say that by combining twa- with the
subjunctive form of the verb in 14, we form the past tense
as in 15 below.
15. (a) twà-tmàngwl	 (we broke)
(b)	 -echete	 (he/she spoke)
Note the Slight change in the tone marks influenced by this
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combination of the subject prefix with the subjunctive
verb form. This then is how the so-called general past
is usually expressed morphologically. As should be
expected by now, the interpretation of the "simple past" time
that these utterances contain is again dependent on the
temporal adverbials. 13 and 15 easily co-occur with
adverbials like yesterday or last yer or a minute ago.
%	 S.	 .	 .	 -	 -	 .116. Y: Chéwa3abu a-uleje nguku mwaches
C: Wjbi -n-ph nkthki châk chth'
E: Wajabu killed a chicken last year
The difference between 13 and 16 is simply that
between the temporal adverbials i.e. the difference is
In the distance there is between the event time and the
speech time of the utterances. In 16 the event is interpreted
as being further away from the speech time of the utterance
than it is in 13. And if we had an adverbial which was
equivalent to "a minute ago", the distance would be only
"theoretically" more distant from the speech time of
the utterance in 16 than say, it would be for the
interpretation of the "perfect" for instance in 13.
1-i.1.3 The difference between the "sirnple past" and
the "present perfect"
Before we describe the difference between the simple
past and the present perfect interpretation, let us first
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sketch two other "pasts" which are relevant to the issue.
The first is what is mostly	 referred to as the "immediate
past". In Cheia this is marked by the so-celled habitual
marker -ma- and in Yao by a variant of the iterative
marker —. 17 illustrates the point.
'	 ,	 -	 .'	 .s	 / -	 I
17. Y: tu-utwlche-3e mjaho pangakaa'pa
C: ti-m-thmng mjàhb p6sachéd\rà'p
E: we were running a race just now
In the context of the "present time" adverbial given,
17 refers to immediate past. But in the context of the
"long distance" temporal adverbial like "in those days"
17 takes on a past habitual reading as is exemplified by
18.
—	 ¼ .
	
I .18. Y: tu-utwiche-je maho je'ndasi',jo
I -	 .% ¼	 -	 ¼C: tI-m-thamanga maho nthawi lmeneyo
E: we would run a race in those days
This type 0±' habitual past can also be expressed by the
"copula" -11 for Yao and -nka- for past habitual marker,
for Chea; and "used to" for English as in 19.
¼	 ¼	 i I	 6	 ,..'	 ¼19. Y: twa-li-ji. nku-utuka mjah'b je'ndawi',jo
C: tI-nk-thàmngS mjâhb nthwI lm6n'yb
E: we used to run a race in those days
Chea could also express the same idea using the "copula"
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i.e. -11, instead, as in 20.
',	 - .	 '	 / a-	 %	 % .	 ,20. C: ti-na-li ku-'thamanga mjaho rithwi rnenèyb
E: we used to run a race in those days
But the reason why we group these utterances under
this section is because, to all intents and purposes, the
distance of the time of the event from the speech time
of the utterances in these examples, is often inferred
on pragmatic grounds. 17 - 20 could co-occur with an
adverbial like "today" for example, hence bringing the
event time even closer to the speech time, without
inducing ungrammaticality. In other words, these utterances,
17 -20, could be used where we would normally use the
so-called present perfect.
Generally however, the "present perfect" is expressed
in Yao by attaching the subject prefix to the subjunctive
form of the verb root without any intervening marker.
In Chea the last vowel of the subject prefix is usually
r-a and this is attached to the verb root with a zero marker
intervening. 11 illustrates the point.
21. Y: ChWjàbti -jIgil chItbi c}il
- - % .'C: Wajabu wa-tenga buku lija
E: Wajabu has taken the book
The difference in meaning between the present perfect
and the simple past has been difficult to clarify within
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truth-conditional treatments as well. 21 and 22 for
example, are truth-conditionally similar.
.v_'_	 -	 '. I-'	 %22. Y:ChWjb'u -p.gele chitabu chila
'S '	 -C:WIjabu a-na-tenga b6ki' i1j
E:Wajabu took the book
That is, propositions expressed by the utterances in 21
and 22 are said to be true at some point in time which
is anterior to the speech time of the utterance (Cf.
the Reichenbachian treatment adopted below).
In other descriptions however, (Cf. Bull, 1963,
and others) the present perfect subsumes what we call
here the speech time of the utterance, that Is, there is
as it were, a continuous temporal line which stops where
the temporal stretch of the speech time stops and these
two temporal lines overlap. With the simple past however,
this is not the case.
It is important to remember however, that for Yao
and Che'a, the problem of the difference between the
simple past and the present perfect is not entirely
parallel to that of English. In English the so-called
present time denoting adverbials that we saw in 6, e.g.
"recently", are supposed to co-occur with the perfect
while past time adverbials like "yesterday" or "last year"
co-occur with the simple past; but in Yao and Che*a there art
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no such constraints. What is germane to all the three
languages is the notion of "current relevance" as it
has been discussed extensively by McCoard (1978), Inoue
(1978. 1979) and others. Most of these descriptions
emphasise however, the same point we made earlier, that
the perfect is to be interpreted as signalling time
which is relevant to the speech time of the event in
question, whereas the simple past denotes a time which
is distinct from the speech time.
We might sum up this rather inconclusive feature
of the difference in meaning between the simple past
and the present perfect by considering the following
two utterances.
-	 •	
••	 •	 •	 ••	 f%	 -	 S•23. Y: CheWjbu -utwiche pangakaa'pa
C: Wjâbti w-thàning p6schdw'pâ
E: Wajabu has run just now (recently)
2L1.. Y: ChWjàbti à-itw^ch thmbInd th*IiI
C: Wjbti w-thàmng mphndi zIwfrI zth'zl
E: Wajabu ran two minutes ago/these last two minutes
The point which is difficult to resolve semantically Is
the interpretation of the relative closeness to the
speech time that the English versions in 23E and 24E
particularly denoteIt is not clear semantically why
we should assume for the interpretation of 23E that the
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event is currently relevant when in terms of actual
occurence 2LfE might be regarded to be even closer to
the speech time than 23E, and hence perhaps more
currently relevant. It seems to us however, that this
is a misrepresentation of the nature of semantics
and that the distinction between the simple past and
the present perfect ought to be resolved pragmatically
along the lines indicated in the last chapter.
4.1.4 The interDretation of future time
The following utteranceS include what might be called
the most basic future time markers or means of expressing
the future ti
-	 '
25. Y: ti-k	 tik mala&i
- , '.	 ..C: ti-ki-thamanga maw
E: we are running tomorrow
-.	 '	 •126. Y: tu-tu-utuche malai
C: t^-thmngmwà
E: we run tomorrow
-27. Y: ti-.chf.-tika malai
C: tI-dz(-thm(ngi mwâ
E: we will/shall run tomorrow
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We note that 25 is essentially progressive; it refers
to the future only because of the presence of the future
adverbial. 26 is sometimes referred to as either immediate
future or a future which Is planned or scheduled (Cf.
Huddleston, 1969 and others for English). And in Yao and
Chea 27 is said to signal the distant future. Dowty
(1979) calls 25 the future progressive, 26 the tense-
less future and 27 the regular future. There is consistent
proliferation of terminology on the subject in the
literature both traditional and recent, often causing
confusion.But two points appear to emerge about how
we interpret these markers or the sentences in which
they appear.
The first interpretation concerns the scheduling
of the event which is described when sentences of the form
26 are uttered (Cf. Huddleston, 1969; Goldsmith &
Woisetschlaeger, 1982; Prince, 1982, and others, often
using different nomenclature). Clearly, there is an
aspectual difference between 25 and 26 (or 27 for that
matter) as 25 involves a VP which is in the progressive
form. This point has been noted by Smith C.S (1981, 1982)
that is, 25 is imperfective by virtue of its being
progressive and 26 is perfective. For Dowty (1979) both
25 and 26 entail some form of scheduling of the event,
but they differ (as we are going to indicate in the next
chapter, when we discuss "inertia worlds") in that 26 must
-128-
be true in all future histories whereas 25 will be true
only in some (inertia worlds) future histories - this is
clearly because of the presence of the PROG operator
(Cf. chapter five).
As we have been assuming all along, when these
utterances (which are in effect vague) co-occur with
deictic adverbials and we take into consideration problems
of extra-linguistic context, some of the vagueness with
which they are imbued might be resolved. The question
whether one form in one context refers to distant future
or immediate future or indicates scheduling or not is
best answered pragmatically then.
Other kinds of future are represented by the
utterances in 28 and 29 below:
- ' , 6• \28. Y: t-tu-ka-utuche
-
C: t^-ka-thamanga
E: we will be going to run
29. Y:
0C: ti-dzidza-thamang
E:we will be running
What is sometimes referred to as the "prospective future"
is expressed by 28 which indicates that "we will be
going with the aim	 of wanting to run". And 29 expresses
the idea that in some distant future we intend to be
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engaged in running. As we saw with the aspectual markers,
tense markers could also co-occur with each other
sometimes overruling each other's meaning in the process
and sometimes not. And as with the Interpretation of
past time, the distance between the time in which the
event is expected to happen in the future and the speech
time of the utterance is generally vague, though temporal
adverbials and extra-linguistic factors of context and
subjective choice or judgement will help resolve the
problems.
.1.5 Immediate past and future versus remote past and future
Johnson (1977, 1981 etc.) mentions an interesting
point which is pertinent to a unified interpretation of
aspect and tense in Kikuyu in particular but Bantu
generally. This phenomenon is so important to her that
she has to supplement the Reichenbachian framework for
the interpretation of tense, which she adopts, with a
third category (besides tense and aspect): the so-called
"existential status". This category is meant to account
for the notion of the "immediate, near and remote" past
or future which are morphologized in Kikuyu. If we take
the expression of past time in Cheia alone for example,
the notion of immediate , near or remote past might be
worth indicating. This is particularly called for where
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the morphological markers concerned mark these times
unambiguously in almost all contexts (both linguistic
or non-linguistic).
The Che*a examples in 30, immediately come to mind.
30. (a) t.i-na-thamanga (we ran)
(b) tI-.n-thrnng	 ( we ran but c( as well )
(c) tI-n-thrn(ng	 ( we ran/have run)
It is easy to claim that there might be three kinds of
past time expressed unambiguously in 30. 30(a) has been
called "remote past" for example, because it co-occurs
easily with a "distant time" deictic adverbial such as
"last year". 30 (b) might be said to signal a "near"
past time because it refers to not too distant a time
in the past; it is a past which is also "consequential"
in that it denotes that the process took place sometime
in the past and there was some consequence d. resulting
from it. 30(c) has been termed the immediate past as it
is normally translated as equivalent to the present perfect.4
Generally however, most of these "default" inter-
pretations can be overruled In the context o± temporal
adverbials. The only safe claim we might make about the
sentences in 30 for instance, concern 30(a) which might
be said to refer to any time denoted by an adverbial
which refers to a time well anterior to speech time
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like "yesterday" and any other time prior to "yesterday".
This Is why if we add an adverbial which potentially
overlaps with "present time" as in 31:
31. tI-ná-thma'ng lêr
we ran today (on a day like today)
the utterance is interpreted as meaning the event
happened some time ago today. Otherwise 30(b) and 30(c)
can co-occur with distant or immediate time temporal
adverbials given the appropriate contexts (both linguistic
and extra-linguistic).
The point we would like to stress is that Ulthough
traditional and other grammarians have latched on to the
notion of immediate, near or remote past or future time,
this is not a hard and fast rule for our languages.
Usuqlly the decision as to how immediate, near or remote
past or future time Is from the speech time is dependent
on subjective factors. Immediacy, nearness and remoteness
are essentially pragmatic notions which ought to be
resolved pragmatically. Johnson herself (1981; 167-168)
actually concede.Sthe point when she says,
there is evidence that HOW near or far from
the moment of speaking the position of each
past time interval is depends on a variety of
contextual factors... Clearly, there are
significant pragmatic factors that must be
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taken into account in interpreting the
Kikuyu (and other Bantu) tenses. However,
I do not have the data that would
allow these principles to be built into
the analysis of tenses given here... 5
As we suggest in the final chapter, it Is not in fact
the absence of the data which is important here; rather
the absence of a pragmatic theory which might handle these
cases of the vagueness of utterances In the Interpretation
of tense, that Is at the centre of the matter. And given
the "principle of relevance" as developed by Sperber &
Wilson (1982, and forthcoming) we indicate briefly how
the resolution of such problems might proceed (Cf.
chapter six). The same argument stands for what Johnson
calls the immediate, near and remote future Inter-
pretation. We will not repeat the argument here.6
4.2 An outline of the Reichenbachian interpretation
of tense
In this section we would like to provide a sketch of
one of the most influential models for the treatment of
tense for natural language. As we Indicated in the second
paragraph in 4.0 , Reichenbach proposed a theory for the
interpretation of tense based on three temporal primitives:
the moment of speech (s), the moment of the event (E) and
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some other reference time (R). The various ways in which
we interpret tense in any language, whether or not this
category is assumed to be grammaticalised or covertly
expressed, can, in principle, be described using these
three temporal constructs. S is the central primitive
to which E and R are linked. The appropriate inter
pretation 0± utterances will therefore involve indicating
the relative order of the	 three notions, E could be
anterior to, posterior to, or simultaneous with 3, and
both E and R in turn could be anterior to, posterior to,
or simultaneous with S etc. Simultaneity is indicated by
a comma and precedence by a dash between the three
primitives. This gives us thirteen possible "tenses" as
indicated in the table below,
Table A: a list of all possible combinations of the
three temporal primitives according to
Reichenbach,(p.297).
Structure	 New Name	 Traditional Iame
E-R- S
E,R-S
RE_S)
R - S ,
R-S _EJ
Anterior past
Simple past
Posterior past
Past perfect
Simple past
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Structure
	 New Name
E - S , R	 Anterior present
S , R , E	 Simple present
S , R - E	 Posterior present
SE_R1
S , E - R	 Anterior future
E_S.RJ
S - R , E	 Simple future
S - R - E
	
Posterior future
Traditional Name
Present perfect
Present
Simple future
Future perfect
Simple future
In the above framework, the interpretation of a
sentence such as 32:
,	 \ .t_	 -	 S /"	 %32. Y: CheWajabu *a-jigele chitabu liso
..-' % .,	 -	 - '	 ,	 \C: Wajabu a-na.'.tenga buku dzulo
E: Vajabu took a book yesterday
might go thus: the time in which the utterance is made
is S. The time when the event of taking the book took
place E is simultaneous with the reference time R' denoted
by the deictic adverbial "yest.ra4y". BothE and R refer
to time prior to the speech time of the utterance S. This
could be represented thus:
33. E , R-S
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The present tense is interpreted as having E and
R and S simultaneous with each other. So that a sentence
like 34:
/ /.v	 '	 ' I34. Y: Chewa,jabu a-ku-utuka sambnb j^n^
%	 I - /	 I	 I IfC: Wajbu a-ki-thamanga tsopano lino
E: Wajabu is running right now
where the three temporal primitives E, R and S coincide
can be represented as 35:
35. E,R,S
The future tense could be indicated by the temporal
ordering of the three constructs thus:
36. S..E,R
This would correspond to the interpretation of utterances
like 37.
37. Y: Ch6W(jbti t-ch^-tk'a mlI
C: Wjàbk. à-dz-thm(ng( mwà
E: ajabu will run tomorrow
There are also utterances like 38 where E and R are
not simultaneous with each other, but where E precedes R:
38. Y: ChW(jàbi à-i^-j). -l1 à-pTt pItwIkg
C: Wjabti nkiIt( ati-pftâ pâmeli( tr-m-frk
E: Wajabu had gone when we arrived
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Here all three times must be different as is represented
by 39:
39. E-R-S
where the event time is prior to the reference time which
In turn is prior to the speech time.
And so the interpretation of tense in utterances
proceeds thus, identifying the two times (i.e. E or R)
and indicating how they are related to S, I.e. according
to whether or not they are prior to, posterior to or
simultaneous with S. We give below a representative list
of utterances in the three languages (pp 14G- 142..) followed
by their corresponding temporal structure to indicate how
we interpret these utterances Before we present these
utterances however, let us clear up one point about the
orthogonal nature of the aspect and tense relationship.
4.2.1 Towards a unified treatment of aspect and tense
Reichenbach's original treatment of tense took into
account only two aspectual concepts. The continuity
(or progressivity) of an event over time, was represented
by an arrow written over E thus: 	 • Iteration of an
event was accounted for by dots put over E thus: L
On these terms, a unified treatment of aspect and tense
according to the original Reichenbachian proposal for an
utterance such as 40:
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F	 *	 .. .%40. Y:
	
Wa'jb.i e-k-lya-ga majani.
C: Wjbü i-m-dya ànyIn(
E: Wajabu eats monkeys
can be represtflted as in 41,
'S.
41.	 S,R,E
which indicates that the event of eating is iterated
and that the utterance refers to present time. If Wajabu
is engaged in the eating now, the sentence in 42 might be
the natural one to express.
s_ • S.	 —	 —
— .-42. Y: Ch6Wjabu a-.ku-lya l^jnf sámb(n j2.no
S.	 —	 -.	 - .	 — f -C: Wjâb'i a-ku-dya nyalu. tsopano lino
E: Wajabu is eating a monkey right now
According to the Reichenbachian framework, the inter —
pretation of 42 might be represented by 43:
43.	 S,R,
which says, Wajabu is in the process of eating the monkey
at the time of speaking.
Given the aspectual concepts discussed in the
previous chapter however, we might like to add other
aspectual features over the event E. First, it is necessary
to indicate that E itself has to be understood as
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referring to either activity, accomplishment, achieve-
ment, or state VPs. Reichenbach does not of course,
explicitly say this. But given how we defined aspect
in chapter three, this is a natural outcome. As we
claimed that accomplishments and achievements suggest
an end-point (i.e. are telic, according to Garey, 1957;
Dahi, 1981 and others), we might represent the temporal
structure which they suggest as in 44 (as we have seen):
44.
There are also other event VPs which have a temporal
stretch which is initially closed. These VPs are represented
as we saw in the last chapter as 45 below:
45.
VPs like "start" or "commence" etc. belong to this group.
Other VPs like "resume", "continue" etc. which we said
expressed "resumptive aspect" might be represented
graphically by a combination of 44 and 45 thus:
46. II
46 indicates that the event which might have reached an
end-point some time in the past begins again. The gap
between the
	 two temporal atretches in 46 indicates the
time when the event is temporarily stopped.
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Given 44 -46, we can now be more specific about
the aspectual character of the event E. E could have
any of the temporal stretches in 44 - 46 written over it
to indicate that the event is "completive", "inceptive"
or "resumptive" respectively. A unified treatment of
aspect and tense within a Reichenbachian framework which
takes into consideration the facts just noted, for the
interpretation of 47 for example,
	
.'. •' '	 S.	 5	 / \
	
.
47. Y. CheWa 5jabu a-malisyisye inasengo gala
,..,	 \	 ' S. S	 .-'S.	 S.C: Wajabu wa-maliza ntchito ha
E: Wajabu has finished the work
might be represented as in 48.
-48. E-S,R
48 claims that the event which is characteristically
completive in aspect takes place prior to the speech
time of the utterance which is simultaneous with the
reference time 4 That is, both S and R which overlap
are posterior to the comp1etive'
\here the utterance is aspectually inceptive as
in 49 below:
49. Y: Ch6Wjâb't.i -t(ndit(msng gi
S	 S.	 S.	 %C: Wa3abu a-na-yamba ntchito ija
E: Wajabu started the work
-1 z*O.
we might represent its interpretation as in 50:
50.
As for the resumptive aspect, we might represent
an utterance such as 51 as i 51E.
%	 ' 	 -	 ' '	 ,. ' \	 '.	 d•51. Y: Cha,jabu a-tandi.lile rnasengo gal
.' S..	 —	 /..	 . S.C: Wa3abu a-na-yarnbilila ntchito ija
-1--E: Wajabu resumed the work	 = E , R — S
This then is how we might go about indicating
a unified treatment of aspect and tense without too much
departure from the original Reichenbachain framework.7
We can now provide a number of representative sentences
with their interpretation according to the model adopted
in this section. The list which is not meant to be
exhaustive, is particularly intended to show how some
problems of the interpretation of tense and aspect
(which we discuss in the next chapter slightly more fully),
might be resolved in some cases and in others fail to be
resolved (Cf. the next section and footnote 7) 8
A list of representative sentences and their meaning
according to the Reichenbachian framework :
52. Y: Ch\jb'U -i1 nkii-lym6hg
%_' 'C: Wjb'.i -i1 kti-dy( maungu
E: 'vvajabu is eating pumpkins = S , R ,
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53. Y:	 Wjb.i	 -i1-j1 -.iI	 11s6'
- ,\ S.
	
-	 -	 .-C: Wajabu a-na-il a-ta-dya dz10
E: Wajabu had eaten by yesterday =	 - R - S
54. Y: t-i1-i md?ig lIs
% - SC: ti-ria-dya maungu dzul
E: we ate pumkins yesterday = E,R-S
% S	 V55. Y: tu-lile mongu lel
t	 S	 SC: ta-dya maungu lero
E: we've eaten purnkiris today	 =	 - S , R
\	 ,	 , / / , , ,•% -56. Y: tu-ku-lya mongu moa gosope
/ ._/ S	 S	 S -C: tiina-dya maungu masiku onse
E: we eat pumpkins everyday 	 = S, R , E
57. Y: ti-ki.I-ly m6ngu sarnbn? j1n6
C: t1-kt-dyi mrigi pàn6'p
E: we are eating pumpkins now = S , R , E
S58. Y: ti-ti-ly m6ngi pngaka'apa
-	 -	
- 
S. SC: t1-dy( mungu posachedwapa
E: we will eat pimpkins soon =S-R,E
	
,	 S	 ..'	 - a S59. Y: tu-tu-chi-lya mongu malai
	
S	 IC: tr-dza-dya maungu rnawa
E: we hill eat pumpkins tomorrow = S - R ,
- 
1+2-
%	 , /60. Y: t6-t '-k-lye-je mongu
' -C: tf-dzf-k-dy' maungu
E: we will be going to eat pumpkins = S - R-
61. Y: t-tI.-t-j th-k-1y m6ngi
•1•	 %	 -	 •%	 _ 'C: ti-ma-ti ti-ka-dye maungu
E: we were going to eat pumpkins
.-	
'S	 ' 	 %.	 .'	 -	 -62. Y: tu-ti-te-je tu-lye mongu ii
-	 .,	 .	 ' 'C: tI.-m-t^ ti-dye maungu lero
E: we were eating purnpins today
= R-E-S
(on one inter-
pretation)
= R-S,E
i	 %	
.0 "	 .	 '63. Y: lIs6 tu-ti-.e-je tu-iye mongu maiawi
C: dzifo tI-ma-tr t^-dyi mt1ng m
E: yesterday we were eating pumpkins tomorrow
=R-S-T
64. Y: tI-tI-sè ti-lI th-lllIm6ngü j('ndà*.C'j
%	 -	
-	 ø•	 0	 /	 %C: ti-khala ti-ta-dya maungu nthawi lmene'yo
E: we'll have eaten pumpkins then = S -- R
4.3 Some limitations of the Reichenbachian model
The claim that this framework makes for the inter-
pretation of tense in all utterances of natural language
is obviously attractive. The problem of the interpretation
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of the "simple past" versus the "present perfect" which
we said was so difficult to resolve within the truth .-
conditional treatment (Cf. chapter five) for example, is
resolved by indicating the appropriate order of the three
primitives for each of the utterance5 (Cf. 48 and 50).
Other issues that this model handles more elegantly
than most, is that of the provision of the appropriate
construal of complex utterences which contain a sequence
of tenses and where several temporal adverbials of different
types co-occur in one utterance making it difficult to
locate the time that the utterance intended (Cf. Smith,
C.S. , 1978). Clearly, the model is also attractive
because it depends on theoretical primitives which are
neutral to morpho-syntactic configurations of individual
languages.
There are however, one or two limitations which the
model appears to be unable to handle clearly as developed
so far. One, concerning	 the status of the third primitive
( the reference time) has been questioned by McGilvray
(1974). And Comrie (1981b) indicates how this primitive
appears to be unnecessary in certain constructions.
R is definitely necessary for utterances like 38 which
are interpreted in the form of 39. In most of the utterances
where R and E are simultaneous however, there appears to
be no need for postulating the third primitive (R). The
-1 41..
conclusions reached by Comrie (1981b) on the issue
apply here.
Perhaps more seriously than this, Wachtel (1982)
indicates five objections to Hornstein's (1977) inter-
pretation of the Reichenbachian framework. These show
that the model fails to account for the meaning of
certain utterances. Essentially these concern the inter-
pretation of one or more utterances which have the same
E, or R and S structure where there appears to be some
(intuitively semantic ) difference between them. Take
the following utterances taken from Wachtel ( p . 336).
65.E: John comes home tomorrow
Y: ChJd'n. à-kwfs(kmsI màlwi
-	 ,'	 .' ...	 '	 %C: Join a-fika kumudzi mawa
66. E: John will come home tomorrow
#	 s %	 .. 'Y: CheJonj. ta-chi-ika kumusi malaw
I.'.C: Join a-dza-fika kumudzI rnawa
It is claimed that 65 suggests J&'n's a coming as a
scheduled, planned, calculated or somehow pre-structured
event, according to what Huddleston (1969), Goldsmith &
Woisetschlaeger (1982),Prince (1982) etc. believe about
the English examples. This and many others are typical
of those problems which even truth-conditional analyses
of the ontague kind for instance, fail to handle. Tt(e
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suggest that these problems be resolved within pragmatics
rather than the semantics which we discussed in this
chapter or that which we sketch in the next.
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FOOTNOIES TO CHAPTER. FOUR
1. It must be clear by now that this thesis is not
particularly concerned with the morphological
description of tense. For a fuller treatment of the
various morphological rules for the formation of past,
present and future"tenses",readers are referred
especially to Whiteley's (1966) work on Yao which we
consider to be representative of the best h'traditionaltt
description of most Bantu languages. For this reason we
will not be concerred with lists of tables of morpho-
logical markers of tense, as might be expected.
2.Clearly, our "traditional" interpretation here, is
influenced by the Reichenbachian framework which we in fact,
introduce later in this chapter.
3.We refer to these factors as "subjunctive factors"
because the morphology of tense is bound up with that
of mood. This area is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Suffice it to say that it is easier to understand how
the perfect or past tense is formed in Yao if we assume
that the subjunctive rule formation operates on the VP
first.
4. What marks the three tenses in
	
30 is clearly the
-1k?-
assignment of the appropriate tone to the past time
marker	 for Chea.
5. On these terms, it might be tempting to re 1ject even
the very innovative notion that Johnson introduces i.e.
the so-called "existential status" which is proposed
by and large, to cope with the problems of nearness,
immediacy or remoteness of past or future time from
the speech time. This is particularly the case s1iould a more
elegant pragmatic principle that might resolve these
issues appear ( as it happily now does: Cf. chapter six
where we indicate which).
6. We have not indicated all the cases where tense is marked in
Yao or Che'-a in the above sections. We have in particular
not indicated the interaction of tense markers with
11auxiliary t' VPs. Some of the utterances where these VPs
are used are listed with their interpretation according
to the Reichenbachian model, without really discussing
them at all (Cf. sentences 52 -614 	).
-1 48
7. Notice how the problem of the difference in
interpretation between the "simple past and the
"present perfect" for sentences Lf9 and 47 are
resolved by 50 and 48 respectively. Notice also that
there is no reason why we might not represent both
the completive temporal structure say, and the
progressive temporal structure over E where a completive
VP might be in the progressive form etc.. The page
might look a bit messy, but we would have gained more
conceptual clarity.
8. The list oZ sentences provided here is only represent-
ative of some of the interpretation of utterances within
the framework developed by Reichenbach. The aspectual
temporal structure superscripted over E is one
representation of activity VPs which we have assumed
have gaps. States would normally be represented as gapless
temporal lines according to the claim ol' the previous
chapter. This much is not really too controversial. We
have left the lines over E open although it might be
argued that it would be better if we closed them on both
ends for events that took place at a time prior to S.
9. Although the issue of the interpretation of utterances
with a sequence of tenses is Important, we do not have any
new ideas to add to those already presented by Smith
C.S. (1978). Readers interested in the treatment of
sequence of tenses and (constraints on) co-occurr'arl,€.
of tenses with temporal. adverbials within the present
framework, are strongly recommended to that work.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SOME LI1ITATIONS OF THE TRUTH-CONDITIONAL TREATMENT
OF ASPECT AND TENSE
5.0 Introduction
It is widely acknowledged throughout the literature
that the classical truth-conditional treatment of aspect
and tense as pioneered by Prior (1967) and others, has
limitations which manifest themselves particularly in
the description of such problems as the so-called
"imperfective paradox", the "gaps problem" and what we
might refer to generally as problems for aspect and tense
of the interpretation of indeterminate or vague utterances.
This chapter deals with these issues. It examines the
various proposals which have been offered to resolve these
problems within the truth-conditional, model-theoretic
and "possible worlds" framework of the Montague-type
(Cf. Dowty, et al. (eds), 1981 : 3-13, for a clear
exposition of the use of the three notions generally),
and finds them wanting.
This chapter concentrates on how Dowty (1977, 1979),
Bennett (1981) and Viach (1981) and others have attempted
to resolve the problems at hand within a Montague-type of
framework.	 start by a brief discussion of Viach's
(1981) so-called "recursive definition" of truth. We then
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consider the various truth conditions proposed for the
interpretation of the Progressive in English to account
for such issues as the gaps, the imperfective paradox
etc. We demonstrate that although the truth conditions
proposed by Dowty, Bennett and Viach are perhaps
generally plausible from the semantic point of view,
they fail to account for the pragmatic factors involved
in the interpretation of such utterances. That is, the
truth conditions proposed for the treatment of certain
facets of aspect and tense purport to handle pragmatic
factors involved in the interpretation of temporally
vague utterances but they generally fail. This clears
the ground for the pragmatic approach which we propose
in the next chapter.
5.1 The search for a recursive definition of truth
The truth-conditional treatment of aspect and tense
as pioneered by Prior (1967) and others, has always taken
the assignment of the truth value of propositions expressed
by utterances "at" instants or moments of time as standard.
If we take the example in 1:
#	 %	 %	 -	 '1.	 Y: CheWa3abu a-temangwile lulc6ngôlo pa teni koloko
C: b'Iajabu wà-thy1 mwènd pa teni 1coioco
E: ajabu broke a leg at ten o'clock
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the proposition expressed is evaluated to be true or
false "at" the instant (or the stroke) of ten. Alternatively,
Wajabu will be taken to be in the extension of the predicate
(or VP) "break" "at" the instant of time given (i.e. ten
o'clock) in some possible world.
Where there has been a shift from this position,
where the "instant" has been replaced by the "interval"
for instance, individuals have been taken to be in the
extension of predicates still "at" the appropriate interval
of time. In 2 below,
-	 -	 -	 -2. Y: CheWa,jabu 'a-kamwile maseng liso
-	 4'	 4'C: Wajabu a-na-gwira ntchito dzulo
E: Wajabu worked yesterday
the proposition expressed is true or false "at" the interval
of time that liso, dzulo (yesterday) denote.
And where intervals of time are taken to constitute
subintervals (Cf. Bennett & Partee, 1978), propositions are
true or false "at" subintervals of time. In the case of
"activity propositions" for example (as we saw in chapter
three), the truth of the proposition at the subinterval of
time is construed to indicate its truth at the larger
interval of time of which the subinterval Is a part. This
situation holds for the interpretation of "stative
propositions" as well. But the truth of "event propositions"
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at intervals of time does not necessarily guarantee their
truth at each subinterval of time (often causing thereby
the imperfective paradox to which we will turn presently).
This tradition persists in such recent interval-semantics
treatments of aspect and tense as Bennett & Partee (1978),
Bennett (1981), Dowty (1977, 1979,1982), Heny (1982),
Richards (1982) and many others where not only are prop-
positions true or false "at" intervals or subintervals
of time, but more important, where the notion of "truth at"
is assumed to be the basic notion, and the truth of a given
proposition at an interval of time is supposed to guarantee
its truth at all instants or subintervals which constitute
the interval.
This classical treatment of truth is, however, limited
with regard to the interpretation of certain utterances.
The point is clearly made by Dowty (1979: 137-138) when he
says:
a fundamental limitation of the aspect calculus
as developed so far, a limitation it shares with
virtually all previous formal treatments of tense
and time reference ... lies in taking the notion of
the truth of an atomic sentence at a moment of time
as basic, rather than the truth of a sentence over
an interval of time. One can of course express in
a certain sense the fact that a sentence is true
1 51..
over a certain interval by means of the AT operator
and quantification over time ... But in all these
cases an "interval" sentence counts as true just
in case one of its embedded atomic sentences is
true at all moments during that interval ... It is
this "independence" of the truth of its constituent
sentence(s) at all moments within the interval that
traditional tense logic is not equipped to deal
with.
It is also clear from other recent work that the classical
assignment of truth of propositions "at" instants, sub-
intervals and intervals of time especially for event
propositions, is semantically incomplete and pragmatically
fails to reflect accurately how propositions are interpreted
or processed for comprehension in actual discourse 2•
Take the central problem o± the semantic interpretation
of the Progressive in English which Vlach (1981) discusses.
First, as Vlach ( pp . 275-276) in footnote 8 himself claims,
there is no apparent justification for assuming that the
truth of propositions "at" instants or intervals of time is
the basic notion, a point which echoes Dowty's sceptical
remarks above. Furthermore, Viach implies that the
continuation of the assignment of the truth of propositions
"at" intervals and subintervals of time, limits the search
for a "recursive" definition of truth. Viach is also
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obviously concerned about Bennett & Partee's proposed
subinterval property of time which he wants to reject as
a preliminary move to his own proposals for the truth
conditions for the Progressive in English and which he
also probably thinks (as we do) contributes to the gaps
problem rather than helping to resolve it. Viach's
proposed compromise therefore, that propositions be
treated "at" the interval, ttjfltt the interval and "for"
the interval of time (footnote 8) does not come as a
surprise. We see it as being essentially double-
barrelled: it is meant to provide, inter alia, a
recursive definition of truth as well as indicate the
direction of a possible solution to the gaps problem
(Cf. below).
5.1.1 The "Gaps Problem" in the interpretation of aspect
We believe that Viach's proposal is in the right
direction. In defence of the three notions of truth for
example, it is plausible to claim with Viach that in 3,
the proposition expressed ought really to be assigned its
truth "at" the relevant time (2.00).
3. Y: CbF'iaicisi wa-wich pnn'p? 2 k?lbk'b
1'	 -#,	 -	 _., S	 .	 '
: rakclsl a-na-iika pamwambapo p 2 klk
E: I'iax reacted the top at 2.00
But the proposition in 4 is accurately evaluated "for"
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the hour-long interval of time. This is particularly
clear given the "enduring" nature of the temporal
structure of stative VPs which we argued for in chapter
three.
4. Y: Chikisi -tmi 	 6i jm
- S S
	 S - SC: Nakisi wa-khala pano ole limodzi
E: Jiax has been here for one hour
That is, 4 is true if and only if there exists an hour-
long interval of time such that "Max be here" is true
"for" that hour.
5. Y: ChkisI wa-tawil nymb chk ch g 1972
- -	 - -C: M1ds -na-manga nyumba chaka ch 1972
E: 'ax built a house in 1972
As for the proposition expressed in 5, its truth can be
evaluated "in" the appropriate 1972 interval of time.
Given the appropriate temporal adverbials then, Viach's
claim about the three notions of truth is patently
adequate for the accurate interpretation of such
propositions as 3 - 5.
However, a consideration of the truth of propositions
in relation to their use, which might be suggested in the
spirit of Austin (1962) who called for a distinction to be
made betveen the truth of propositions and their appropriate
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use in discourse or context, exposes what is concealed in
the above treatment. When 5 is uttered for example,
several implications are intended, whose choice indicates
how the proposition is to be processed. Although the
truth of the proposition is accurately evaluated "in" the
1972 interval of time, to all intents and purposes, the
interval of time is really unspecific or indeterminate
or vague. It is not obvious from the truth-conditional
analysis of 5 for example, that the house was built ttj.jfl
the whole of the 1972 interval of time or "for" only seven
months in that year or "at" regular intervals throughout
1972 etc. And it is clear that the hours when Max slept
or was having lunch are irrelevant.
Similarly, when L is uttered, it does not follow
that Max did not move away from the said location for a
minute or two (to repair to the toilet). We may be
splitting hairs, but it is true that the interpretation
of the location or the referent for the VP "to be here
for an hour" is dependent not only on its semantic content
(i.e. linguistic factors) but on extra-linguistic factors
as well. In other words, "gaps" exist in intervals or
subintervals of time, but in an interval-type truth-
conditional treatment of propositions, these are either
ignored or subsumed (without proper justification or
explanation) under the proposed interpretation. What is
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even more interesting is the fact that, even the evaluation
of these propositions "at" or "in" or "for" intervals of
time, does not seem to resolve the problems.
Viach gives other types of "gaps" in the interpretation
of propositions.
6. E: Ralph taught for a year
Y: ChL'ft	 -j.gny cMk chm
C: Lf à-n-pthnzits chk chimôdzI
The proposition expressed by 6 can be evaluated for its
truth "at", "in" or "for" the year-long interval of time
despite the fact that Ralph did not in fact teach during
the three months summer vacation. We might hasten to add
that this also depends on the semester or term system
involved (i.e. encyclopaedic information): the VP "to
teach for a year"conveys something different in a British
system of education from what it might convey in an
American one.
On these terms, 7 might be construed as true
7. E: Ralph attended the meetings for a year
Y: ChLafi	 -Jtilà'g kz msngnb'k chk chm?
-	 4• -	 .C: Lfi -ma-pta ku misonkhnb'k chka chimodzi
despite the fact that the meetings were monthly or quarterly;
but not held in December only of that year. Vlach continues:
the attendance of four meetings out of five and not out of
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fifty, is enough for the truth of the proposition in 7
to 6e decided upon 3. In other words, there are
propositions like 7 or 8:
8. E: tiax has been selling cars for a week
- I	 •b .%	 -	 -	 -Y: CheMakisi a-sumisye-je magalimoto nnungo wospe
- S	 S % - %	 -	 %C: Makisi a-ma-gulitsa magalimoto mlngu wons
whose interval of time at which they might be true involves
gaps in an uncontroversial way. The idea of selling cars
does not entail that the selling takes place at every
moment (instant) of the supposed interval of time involved.
This is further justification for the temporal gaps which
we claimed were characteristic of certain VPs when we
interpret the utterances In which they appear (Cf. chapter
three). As we indicated in chapter three entailment rule 25
(i.e. X is V -ing	 3 has V -ed) fails to apply, as is
evidenced by the cancellable nature of the truth of the
first part of the proposition in 9 (i.e. 8 may be true
even If no car has been sold, as is the case in 9).
_-	 ' %	 S	 .'	 S9. Y: CheLLaklsl a-su-misye-je mg1mtb nntingti
- S	 -	 - •	 -	 - I	 •• % S S S	 -
wosope-wu nambo pangali jwasumile galimoto anta
jim.
S s
	 s	 S	 -	 S	 S	 SC: Nakclsl a-ma-gulitsa maga1moto miungu wonse'wu
S S
	 - - .Ikoma paLlbe waguia glm?t? ndi !rn6dz y6mw
E: Max has been selling cars for a week, but not
a man has showed up to buy one.
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Finally, there is Viach's famous example In 10 and 11:
10: E: Is anyone sitting here?
' ,	 - - - -
	 %Y: Pana jwa-ku-tama apa?
C: Pali a-ku-khala apa?
11. E: There is someone sitting here.
•	 ..Y: Pn mundu w-ku-iama
C Pl1 munthu a-ku-khala
10 is a question asked for instance, of a person in the
theatre whose partner is temporarily out during intermission.
First, the person asking the question knows full well that
the proposition is false "at" the interval of time when the
question is posed, that is, the speaker can see the empty
seat where nobody is sitting. The answer in 11 however, is
to be Interpreted as true "for" the interval of time in
which the couple intended to stay in the theatre (e.g. from
the start of the performance to the end). But it is false
"at" or "f or" the interval of time when the question Is
posed. There appears therefore to be a paradox here
where 11 might be both true and false without inducing
any contradiction.
The gaps problem is more common than this. Take a
variant of Wilson's (1975: 105) sentence (our 12 below):
12. E: Susie read The Times yesterday.
- '	 .Y: Abiti Suse wa-wa-lsilê' The Times lls.
% •- - ..C: Süz a-na-weleng The Times dzulo.
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the interpretation of the proposition expressed does not
involve the assumption that Susie read every page or every
line or every advert of The Times nor does it suggest that
the reading took every minute of the "yesterday" interval
of time.
All these facts not only point to the limitations of
current truth-conditional treatments of these utterances,
but more seriously they suggest that it is right that we
in fact, consider gaps as natural phenomena. The interval
structure of certain VPs like "to read The Times" or "to
watch a performance at the theatre" (obviously because of
the influence of the NP) conversationally implicate temporal
gaps. In actual use the gaps do not seem to depend on the
category of the VPs either (perhaps the only exception is
the group of VPs which we called "pure achievements" in
chapter three, e.g. "explode" etc.).
5.1.2 The semantic resolution of the gaps problem
We have indicated above that Vlach's three notions
of truth or his search for a recursive definition of truth,
goes some way towards recognizing (however implicitly) that
gaps do exist In processing utterances. What this semantic
treatment fails to indicate (and it is probably not intended
to) is how the decision or the choice is made between the
interpretation of a proposition like 11, "at" the Interval
- 162-
of time or "for" the interval of time in question i.e.
that 10 is used to express what "Is this seat taken?"
is normally meant to convey. In other words, it is not
clear even after the provision of the three notions of
truth, how the right choice of the "context" for the
appropriate interpretation of 10 or 11 is made.
Another solution to the gaps problem was provided
by Bennett (1981) who in fact, was the first linguist to
term the problem the "gaps problem". Bennett explicitly
indicated that gaps exist in the interpretation of
utterances. To take account of these gaps in the
processing of utterances, he proposed what he called
"a union of connected intervals" of time. Bennett (p.20)
specifically said "sentences are to be evaluated with
respect to unions of intervals, and not just intervals.
A union of intervals of time, of course, might not be a
connected set of moments of time; there might be gaps. "
This is instantiated by the interpretation of a sentence
like 13.
13. E: John built a house in one month last year.
-	 ' -#. 9 _
	 -	
-
Y: ChJoni. wa-tawil nymbâ mwsi. umpepe mwacheso
- - -	 - -	 - - .C: Jni a-na-manga nyumba mwezl uniodzi chk chth.
Bennett graphically represented this sentence as 14 below,
where among other things, gaps are accounted for in its
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interpretation.
14.
ti 	 t2	 t3	 t4
According to 14, 13 is interpreted thus: at t 1 John begins
building the house and at t4 the house is completed. But
at t2 it was being built, though there was a gap at t3
when the house building temporarily stopped. We can see
how the assumption of gaps for the VP (or the utterances
it in part constitutes) naturally accounts for any
potential paradoxes or ambiguities.
It is with these assumptions that Bennett gives the
truth condition in 16 for the interpretation of 15:
15. E: Jones is leaving.
/ -	 -	 -Y: CheJonesi a-ku-tyoca.
-.- S	 %	 -
C: ionesi. a-ku-choka.
A typical Nontague-like truth condition for 15 and other
such event propositions is 16:
16. "Jones is leaving is true at a union I of
intervals of time if and only if I is a moment
of time, and there exists a union I' of
intervals of time such that	 is an open,
connected interval, I is included in I',
and Jones is in the extension of leave at It,i
(Bennett, 1981: 20).
Bennett himself however, indicated how the semantic
rule in 16 fails to account for the important distinction
between the interpretation of 15 as a progressive (or
continuous) proposition from its habitual, or frequentative
(or iterative) one. The point is illustrated better with
activity VPs than with event VPs. As Bennett indicated
16 fails to account for the logical difference in the
interpretation of sentences like "John is running", "John
runs" and "John frequently runs". As we indicated in
chapters three and four the problem can of course be
resolved by claiming that morphological markers and
temporal adverbials might unambiguously indicate the
intended interpretation (i.e. habitual, frequentative or
progressive). But Bennett (p.21) pointed out that on the
non-reportive reading "John runs", "John is running",
"John is frequently running", "John frequently runs" etc.
are intuitively and logically similar. On this logical
reading each of these sentences could be interpreted as
expressing habituality, mere iteration or frequency, or
progressiveness. The appropriate interpretation of these
utterances (especially "John is running") without their
linguistic contexts (i.e. adverbials etc.) can only be
provided when appeal to the extra-linguistic context is
made. The truth condition proposed by Bennett for the
interpretation of the sentence "John Is frequently running"
clarifies this point.
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17. "John is frequently running is true at interval
of time I if and only if I is a moment of time,
and there exists an interval of time I'
(possibly constrained In some way by the context)
such that I is included in I' but is not an
endpoint f or I', and John is in the extension
of run with respect to a CLOSED interval of
time MANY times each Oin I', whereis some
measure of length of time, like week, which is
vague." (P.21 ).
What is of particular interest to us about 17 is
how pragmatic factors appear to be incorporated in the
semantic condition. The interpretation of the proposition
expressed by the sentence is obviously vague as is witnessed
by the phrase "possibly constrained in some way by the
context". The "MANY times each o" where orefers to some
indeterminate length of time, even the word "vague" itself,
are Incorporated in 17 - all in all indicating that there
is somtiin pragmatic that 17 purports to handle but
fails to. We suggest that these are cases of vague temporal
reference which can be resolved if the right kind of
pragmatics is invoked (as it is in the next chapter). In
other words, the gaps problem and the interpretation of the
distinction between habitual, frequentative, progressive
and other readings of sentences like those just provided,
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manifest a problem for the Montague semantics treatment
of aspect interpretation which might be better resolved
within pragmatics.
5.2 The "Imperfective Paradox" and its semantic treatment
The limitation of the truth-conditional treatment of
aspect (and tense) is also clearly seen in the analysis of
the so-called imperfective paradox (Cf. Dowty, 1977, 1979
and Declerk, 1979b). The essence of the imperfective
paradox as conceived of by Dowty Is this: whereas the
sentence in 18 with an activity VP In the "imperfective"
present progressive,
-	 S	 .18. Y: C}ieJoni a-kwambula
, p	%	 -C: joni a-ku-jarnbulâ
E: John is drawing
entails its simple past in 19 (or its present perfect as
we indicated
- -	 -	 ••%19. Y: CheJoni wa-jambwile
C: Joni -njmbilâ
E: John drew/has drawn
in chapter three), this entailment fails to apply with
regard to the interpretation of sentences with accomplish-
ment VPs or those achievement VPs which behave like them
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(Cf. chapter three).
.% .	 •1 	.20. Y: ChJ6nt a-jamowile-,je lindndà
C: Jn	 dzr
E: John was drawing a circle/an egg
20 does not entail its simple past (or its present perfect)
in 21:
- -	 ..	 .'	 . ..21. Y: CheJonj.. a- 1janibwile lindànd
%C: Joni wa-,jambula dzr
E: John drew/has drawn a circle/an egg
On standard assumptions of the compositionality of meaning,
we have a paradox.
Dowty's (1977: L 5) solution to this paradox, proposed
in a typical "scrambling" of rather dated efforts of
Generative Semantics and ontague Semantics can be traced
thus. First, he proposes for sentences of this type the
general 'ogical form in 22:
22. EPROG [	 CAUSE [
	 1-
22 is supposed to account for the fact which we noted in
chapter three that accomplishment VPs denote the endpoint
of the event which they describe, i.e. that the progressive
form of the VP "to draw a circle" entails causing the circle
to exist. 22 is an extended version of the logical form in
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23 which implies that "to draw a circle" is to be
interpreted as to cause the circle to exist.
23. [0 CAUSE { BECONE
As we indicated in chapter three however, both 22
and 23 wrongly predict that the circle necessarily came
to exist. As Dowty (1979:1 148) says, "to say that FROG 0
is true just in case	 is true (at a superinterval)
in all worlds having at least such-and-such degree of
similarity to the actual world is to require that
tLQ
always be true in1 ctual world itself whenever FROG
is true - just the condition we want to avoid to account
for the imperfective paradox." Dowty therefore finds it
necessary to introduce another notion in order to account
f or the paradox. This is "a new primitive function which
assigns to each index, consisting of a world and an
interval of time, a set of worlds which might be called
inertia worlds - these are to be thought of as worlds
which are exactly like the given world up to the time in
question and which the future course of events after this
time develops in ways most compatible with the past course
of events" (Dowty, 1979: 148). On these terms, the new
semantic rule for the interpretation of the progressive
accomplishments is as given in 24 below:
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24. .[PROG ØJis true at	 ) 1ff for some
interval I' such that	 and I is not a
final subinterval for I', and for all w'
such that w' €
	 (<I,w)), 0 is true at
<'It,Wt	 ." (ibid: 149).
It is clear from Dowty's own words, that his invocation
01' "inertia worlds" represented in 24 as mr in his truth
condition, is meant to ensure that the existence of the
circle in some future time in some context (or possible
world) is predicted. This in itself is enough proof that
24 fails to indicate how the choice of the appropriate
world in which the circle will be said to actually exist,
is made. That is, "inertia worlds" notwithstanding, the
speaker/hearer still has to choose one possible world
amongst the many available in which the circle will be
said to exist. 24 does not indicate how this choice
might be made.
Viach (1981) also attempts to provide a solution to
the imperfective paradox. He notes that Dowty avoids the
paradox by introducing the further notion of inertia worlds
instead of solving it. He gives the example in our 25:
25. E: John was winning the race
/ -Y: CheJoni a-pndfl-j mjh?'w?
-	 %	 - -	 ..C: Joni. a-ma-prnbana mjah'w
170..
to show that the value "true" could be assigned to this
sentence immediately John goes beyond the other competitors
in the race but before he touches the finishing line. This
fact is as curious as the so-called imperfective paradox.
As we can deduce from 26:
26. E: J0hn was winning the race when he fainted
...	 - % -Y: ChJoni a-pundile-je mjahb'w pi-wa-komokcca-ga
% - I - - - - -C: Joni a-rna-pambana mjâh'w?, pam(n a-ma-komoka
John can truthfully be said to be in the process of winning
the race at or for a given interval of time before the
finishing line is reached although he might not actually
win the race by eventually being the first to touch the line.
To resolve the problem Viach introduces the operator
PROCESS (which is meant to predict the future course of
events almost as Dowty's inertia worlds were meant to).
And the operator Proc	 is defined as the process which
leads to the truth of 0 , making the final formulation of
the truth condition as in 27:
27. "If	 is an accomplishment sentence, then
Proc [Ø)is that process P that leads to
the truth of 0 and such that if	 is to
become true at I, then P starts at the beginning
of I and. ends at the end of I". (Viach, 1981:288)
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We believe that even 27 is rather vague as it does not
specify how the process which leads to the truth of 0'
is arrived at or chosen. Even 27 then which might
appear to be foolproof is not enough to indicate how
the appropriate interpretation is chosen. We do not know
whether in fact	 will become true at i or not. Clearly
given the appropriate context, 0 will be true and this
brings us back to the role that pragmatics has in the
assignment of the appropriate interpretation to vague
propositions which the truth condition in 27 attempts
but largely fails to account for.
5.3 A few problem cases for the truth-conditional treatment
of tense
We have noted that Bennett (1981) concedes that on
the nonreportive interpretation progressives and habituals
could be said to have the same truth value. There are also
other facets of tense which are said to be problems for the
truth-conditional treatment of the category. In this final
section we would like to mention only two important ones.
5.3.1 The simple past versus the present perfect interpretation
The sentences in 28 and 29 are traditionally said to
4have the same truth condition in a classical tense logic.
-	 '28. Y: Ch(Mwâlimu a-temangwii lk'ngl'b
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7.	 ..	 •4C: Aphinzitsi a-thyola mwendo
E: The teacher has broken a leg
'	 4.	 •, _	 S29. Y: ChMwlmii wa-temangwile lukongolo
S	 % S %	 S	 SC: Aphunzits. a-n-thyo1a mwendo
E: The teacher broke a leg
First, as we noted in chapter four, there is a difference
between the English examples in 28 and 29 and their Yao
and Chea counterparts. The English example in 28 is
generally said to co-occur with such temporal adverbials
as "today" or "already" and all those adverbials which
refer to time which is close to the speech of the event.
Temporal adverbials which signal time which is rather
distant from the speech time, such as "yesterday", "last
week", and "a minute ago" etc. do not generally occur with
the English 28, except of course in special contexts, such
as coordination.
This restriction does not apply to Yao and Chea
however. 28 takes these adverbials without inducing
ungrammaticality in the sentences in question. As we
indicated in chapter four the explanation is to be found
in what has been referred to as "current relevance"
(Cf. NcCoard, 1978 and others). In Yao and Chea 	 en
'we say:
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% - -	 -30. Y: CheNwalimu a-trnangw1l l.k5rigla mwachso
C: Aphnzts -thyl mwndô cMk chthà
E: The teacher broke a leg only (Just) last year
we are thinking of the freshness of the event, i.e. we are
bringing the event as it were, closer to the speech time.
Otherwise, the perfect is interpreted in the same- way in the
three languages. 29 on the other hand, signals a distant
past or past which is more removed from the speech time of
the utterances, even before appeal to equivalent distant
adverbials is made. Clearly, for both Yao and Chea the
morphological markers (i.e. the wa + V + lie and na
respectively) are sufficient to indicate the distance
between the time of the event and the speech time of the
utterance. This is probably why the occurrence of the VP
with past time markers and temporal adverbials which
indicate proximity to the speech time might appear
unacceptable, though in fact, it is grammatical.
From a truth-conditional point of view however,
whether the event is far away from the speech time of the
utterance or not is not important, for the truth of both
28 and 29 is evaluated at some past time (that is, time
anterior to the speech time). Truth-conditional semantics
is ill-equipped to deal with the relative distance of the
event time from the speech time of the utterance.
5.3.2 The simple future and the progressive future
interpretation
The final problem we would like merely to indicate,
which the truth-conditional treatment of tense appears to
fail to account for (or at any rate, which there is no
conclusive evidence that truth-conditional semantics is
able to handle without controversy) is the distinction
between the so-called "simple futurate" versus "progressive
futurate". We do not intend to dwell too long on this
point as it has already been touched on in chapter four.
We would just like to suggest that perhaps Prince (1982),
Smith, C.S. (1981b, 1982) and Goldsmith & Woisetschlaeger
(1982) as well as ]Jowty (1979) of course, are representative
of the various strands. The problem can be illustrated by
Dowty's (1979:154-155) examples:
31. E: John is leaving town tomorrow
% -	 - .	 , %Y: CheJoni a-ku-tyoka m'tawuni malawi.
, -C: Joni a-ku-choxa mumz.nda maw
32. E: J0hn will leave town tomorrow
S	 - S
Y: ChJ6L ta-chi-tyoka mtawuni ma.awi
S	 -	 S -C: Joni a-dza-choka mutauni mawa
33. E: John leaves town tomorrow
p	 -	 S -	 S S	 SY: CheJoni ta-tyoche rntawuni malawi
-	 S S	 S - S -C: Jon. a.-choka mutauni maw
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The problem about the truth-conditional treatment
of 31 - 33 appears to concern the distinction in the
truth conditions between 32 and 33 on the one hand, and
between the two and 31 on the other. According to Dowty
apparently both the progressive futurate and the simple
futurate convey the notion of the scheduling of the event
which they describe. But simple futurates are evaluated
for their truth at all future histories whereas, as we
have seen with the invocation of the "inertia worlds" the
progressive futurates must be true only in some future
(inertia) world. As Prince (1982:4. 53) indicates the
difference between the truth conditions of the simple
futurates and the progressive futurates appears to be
one of degree, the truth of a simple futurate proposition
being more certain than that o± the progressive futurate.
This in effect, is reminiscent of what we have just noted
in 5.3.1 where the truth of the simple past proposition
is distinct from that of the present perfect by the
distance (degree) that the event is from the speech time
of the utterance. The other proposal (which we will not
bother to discuss but which is based on Goldsmith &
Woissch1aeger's (1982) notion that simple futurates entail
that the knowledge of the future event is structured in a
way that that of the future event of the progressive
futurate is not), is provided by Prince (1982) herself.
1 ?6
But even Prince ends on a note which is of interest to us
and which we would like to conclude with. She says that
even in her proposal she has not indicated
"the possible interaction of the semantics of SEa
(simple futurates) (or of PFs, Progressive
futurates, for that matter) with pragmatics. Once
this interaction is understood, part of what has
here been attributed to the semantics of SFs may
turn out to be more elegantly handled by specific
conventional implicatures and/or by general
pragmatic principles." (p.463)
5.4	 Conclusion
With these remarks in mind, there is no need to repeat
the limitations of the truth-conditional (or other semantic)
treatment of aspect and tense. We might just conclude with
the words that introduce the pragmatic framework which we
adopt in the next chapter to resolve these issues;
"Linguistic rules alone rarely uniquely determine
tF'e propositional content of an utterance: almost
invariably there are ambiguities to be resolved,
choices among possible references to be made, and
implicit or e].lipsed material to be reconstructed.
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Intuitively, the hearer or reader of an utterance
has a simple method for resolving these indeterminacies:
where there is a choice, he chooses the interpretation
on which the utterance will be most relevant. However,
though undoubtedly true, this is not particularly
helpful as long as we have no idea what relevance is.
An explicit account of relevance would shed some much
needed light on the processes by which disambiguation,
reference assignment and so on are achieved."
Sperber & Wilson (NS:2) "On Defining 'Relevance'"
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE
I •	 For a more general treatment of the limitations of
truth-conditional semantics generally (i.e. not specifically
concerned with the intepretation of tense and aspect) see
Jilson (1975).
2. We accept that the semantic interpretation of utterances
is a different enterprise from its pragmatic interpretation;
and following Austin (1962) we believe that the truth of a
given proposition can also best be decided upon by appeal
to context (or the choice of other pragmatic factors).
3. This in itself is an indication that the assignment of
the truth value of a given proposition is largely a
subjective matter when we consider utterances in contexts.
4. Tich (1980) is the only example we have come across
where an attempt has been made to treat the difference
between the interpretation of the perfect and that of the
simple past within truth-conditional semantics. Whether
it is convincing or not will probably depend on one's
coanitrnent to a formal treatment of such phenomena. Tichç
is probably over—stretching a semantic framework which
cannot handle cases of the construal of indeterminate
utterances.
-179_
CHAPTER SIX
TOwARDS' A PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATION OF INDETERMINATE
UTTERANCES FOR ASPECT AND TENSE
6.0 Introduction
In this chapter we sketch how temporally vague
utterances ought to be treated within a pragmatic frame-
work. Specifically, we show that the problems which we
indicated in the last chapter: the "gaps", the imperfective
paradox, the interpretation of the simple past and the
present perfect, all these and other related problems ought
to be treated pragmatically. We have indicated how the
tru'th conditions proposed for the interpretation of these
issues attempt and largely fail to account for the
assignment of the appropriate temporal reference. In
certain cases the literature mentions implicitly or
explicitly that pragmatic factors of context or subjective
choice operate in the interpretation of these temporally
vague utterances. In some cases (Cf. McCoard, 1978)
pragmatic principles such as the ill-defined "current
relevance" are invoked to indicate how the appropriate
interpretation of the "perfect" for example, is arrived
at. In other cases (e.g. Prince, 1982, in the quotation
in the last chapter), the role of pragmatics In the
interpretation of these utterances is merely mentioned
without being developed. In yet other cases, "context"
or "subjective choice" are mentioned as beixg the notions
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which resolve the temporal indeterminacy of such
utterances; but no rigorous definition of context or
subjective choice is indicated to show how the process
of disambiguation is achieved.
In other words, the role that pragmatics plays in
the interpretation of temporally vague utterances is not
in question. What tends to be questioned is the type of
"pragmatics" which is appropriate for which interpretative
or descriptive model. These generally divide into "formal"
(Cf. Ejerhed, 1981; Kuhn, 1979, for the interpretation of
ambiguity for tense, for example) and the Gricean type
often called "informal" pragmatics. The latter also
divides into "formalized" (Cf. Gazdar, 1979) and "informal"
and in part cognitive based pragmatics (Cf. Sperber & Wilson,
1982, and forthcoming). The rivalry as to what constitutes
the "appropriate" pragmatics is apparent, though this
chapter does not deal with that Issue. It Is worth noting
however, that labelling one framework "informal" does not
necessarily reduce its descriptive or interpretative adequacy
nor does It make the framework less rigorous as Gazdar,
(1979, chapter 1) seems to believe about the Gricean
approach to pragmatics which is not as formalized as his
o,wn.
This chapter first traces the Importance of the
Gricean type of informal pragmatics, as extended by
Sperber & 1ilson (ibid), to handle the interpretation of
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indeterminate or vague utterances. It then takes a few
issues in the interpretation of the vague utterances we
saw in the last chapter and indicates how the Sperber &
Wilson "principle of relevance" appears to resolve the
problems. However controversial the actual application
of this principle might be to the treatment of aspect
and tense, we have for the first tire a pran.atic frame-
work which seriously defines the "context" and the
"principle of relevance", both of which are uncontroversially
taken to be the notions which help resolve the v•agueness of
utterances.
6.1	 Pragmatics in syntactic and semantic description
Before we launch ourselves, it might be a good idea
to make a few remarks to clear a confusion which is often
noted in the literature. Green (1981),talking about the
role that pragmatics plays in the formulation of syntactic
rules within the generative grammar of the last three
decades, accuses these linguists of not acknowledging
this important role. She claims that almost every
syntactic rule proposed in that time has had a pragmatic
constraint or condition or function etc. curtailing it.
This odd (or rather misguided) assumption might appear
plausible where the formulation of recent syntactic theories
might be concerned; (Cf. Bresnan, (ed), 1982; Jacobson &
Pullurn, (eds), 1982 etc.) where these essentially "surface
structure" characterisations of Syntax might appear to be
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influenced by pragmatic factors. Bates et al. (1982) for
example, discuss functional constraints on word order
processing across English and Italian emphasising the
role of pragmatic factors in the description of this one
facet of syntax : word order. Green herself continues
(p.30):
This means that the problem of the proper role
of pragmatics with respect to syntactic
description cannot be dismissed as merely an
interesting puzzle involving a few insignificant
unrelated and unrestricted phenomena. The
involvement of pragmatics (in syntax) is pervasive.
Then we discuss the pragmatics of aspect and tense
below, we would like to dissociate ourselves from these
misleading assumptions. That is, we are not dealing with
pragmatic constraints on rules, but with the pragmatic
interpretation of utterances which semantic rules fail
to account for. Even the model-theoretic system for the
interpretation of utterances concedes that"the truth
conditions of sentences in natural language are partly
determined by 'oragmatic factors t' (Cf. Sgall, 1980:234),
but these have tended to be, as noted earlier, the ttcontextfl
and the speaker/hearer's subjective judgernent or choice of
the relevant interpretation of an utterance .n a set of
alternative interpretations. This has nothing to do with
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so-called pragmatic constraints on rules per Se.
The root of the confusion is probably that some linguists
h-ye tended to see pragmatics as a further component of
the grammar and hence able to interact directly with other
components.	 e see pragmatics rather as a set of
principles - linguistic, logical and encyclopaedic -
brought to bear on the interpretation of utterances
specified (in part) by the grammar.
6.1.1 Choosing a relevant pragmatic framework
The literature is replete with observations that
certain vague utterance be intepreted pragmatically without
indicating what pragmatic principles are involved. This is
perhaps because pragmatic theories have tended to concern
utterance-comprehension rather than utterance-interpretation
as Sperber & Wilson, (1982) note. Also as they explain
(1981: 281), "it is only in the last ten years or so that
pragmatics has become an institutionalized research field,
with its own textbooks, international conferences and
journals. Its contributors are based In a variety of
disciplines, including psychology and psycholinguistics,
linguistics, Al and socielinguistics. The field is so new
and so diverse that no consensus on the basic concepts
and theories, or even on overall goals and research tasks,
has yet emerged."
The situation is obviously changing now. Yet the
choice of the pragmatic framework relevant to the
-184...
interpretation of vague utterances even among the so-called
"informal" ones is not easy. Any pragmatic theory based on
the work of Grice (1968, 1975, 1978 etc.) should be capable
of handling the problems of temporal vagueness of utter-
ances. On these terms, the "speech acts" theories as
developed by Searle (1969), Searle et al, (eds) (1980)
and others are potentially useful. Also along these lines
is Clerk's (1977) system of "bridging" which is not only
Gricean based but also goes some way to indicate how
speakers/hearers constantly build "bridges" across
potentially ambiguous, vague, ungrammatical or sometimes
downright incomprehensible propositions in utterance
processing.
But Clark's "bridges" are presented as a package for
general communication. The framework is not specifically
intended or claimed to handle disambiguation, for instance.
The bridges are in the form of a list of tasks that a
typical hearer has at his disposal in the process of
utterance comprehension. There is no indication of the
structure of the context for example, or the nature of
the inferences one draws from the context or how one
chooses one among the many alternative interpretations of
an indeterminate utterance. And again reiterating Sperber
& ;;nson (1982), Clark's (especially Clark & Iiarsha1l, 1981:
and Clark & Carlson, 1982a, b) is essentially an utterance-
comprehension model of pragmatics which seems ill-equipped
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for the solution of problems which an utterance-
interpretation model ought to handle better. This is
clear from Clark's own words (1977:413) on what he takes
to constitute utterance-comprehension in natural language:
The listener takes it as a necessary part of
understanding an utterance in context that he
be able to identify the intended referents
for all referring expressions ... this requires
the listener to bridge, to construct certain
implicatures, and so he takes these implicatures
too as a necessary pert of comprehension. In
short, he considers implicatures to be intrinsic
to the intended message, since without them the
utterance could not refer.
How the intended implicatures are identified or
chosen however, is not indicated in a principled way.
As Sperber & Wilson (1982) sceptically observe about this
use of the strict Gricean programme of pragTnatics, the
goal of pragmatics is to describe utterance-comprehension.
Similarly, they argue, for Clark comprehension is the
recovery by the hearer of a set of propositions intended
by the speakers.
Sperber & \i1son themselves however, do not reject
Clarkts pragmatics outright. For them utterance- compre-
hension is only one facet of the overall system of
1 6.
utterance-interpretation (Cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1982:
128-130). Their own definition of what constitutes
pragmatics exemplifies this position (Cf. Sperber &
Wilson, 1981b: 281):
The main aim of pragmatic theory is to provide
an explicit account of how human beings interpret
utterances. To do this, one would have to say
how disambiguation is achieved; how reference is
assigned; how sentence fragments are interpreted;
how ungrammatical utterances are dealt with; what
role presuppositional phenomena play; how
implicatures (intended references) are worked out;
how contextual and encyclopaedic knowledge is
brought to bear; and so on. Any organized set
of answers to these and similar questions would
constitute a pragmatic theory on some level of
adequacy.
Having indicated that the problems of the interpretation
of aspect and tense which we dealt with in the last chapter
concern the interpretation of essentially temporally vague
or indetermiiate utterances, the choice of the Sperber &
Jilson framework therefore comes as a natural conclusion.
It is to a brief summary of how they define "context" and
the "principle of relevance" both of which are important
notions in the resolution of the problems at hand, that
we must now turn.
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6.1.2 "Context" and the 'Princi ple of relevance"
The pragmatic framework which we adopt below is
inferential in nature. 2 It deals with the interpretation
of utterances in a context. Sperber & Wilson (1980)
define "context" as a set of propositions which may be
derived from both verbal and non-verbal sources. Ideally
it can be of any size, i.e. tI'ere can be as many propositions
in a given context as there are numbers to describe or count
them (though the size is normally constrained by limitations
of memory). The interpretation or the processing of a
proposition expressed by an utterance in context involves
therefore, the extraction of information from a set of
propositions which make up the context.
The point is illustrated thus:
1. Jackson has just bought a Rolls Royce, but
his wife refuses to drive in expensive cars.
2. The RollS Royce is an expensive car.
3. Jackson's wife refuses to drive in his Rolls
Royce.
In order to interpret the proposition expressed by 1, the
contextual assumption in 2 would have to be supplied or
known. The union of the proposition in I with the back-
ground contextual proposition in 2 gets the output in 3.
-1 8..
That is, given the contextual proposition in 2, 1
conveys 3. This type of inference is called "context-
invariant" in the sense that there is a fixed (an
invariant) context 2 from which a proposition like 3 might
be inferred. But there are also "context-dependent"
implications which are defined as the set of propositions
logically implied by the union of the proposition being
processed and the set of propositions of which the context
is made. These are called "contextual implications" of a
given proposition P in the context C1 .... C. The
examples used to illustrate the point are as follows:
4. (a) If the chairman resigns, Jackson will take
over his duties.
(b) If Jackson takes over the chairman's duties,
the company will go bankrupt.
If 4(a) and (b) are taken to be a set of two propositions
which make up a context, and we add 5 to this context;
5. The Chairman has resigned.
6 and 7 might be obtained as the "contextual implications".
6. Jackson will take over the Chairman's duties.
7. The company will go bankrupt.
In other words, the claim is that the contextual
-189.-
implications in 6 and 7 can be inferred when the set of
propositions which constitutes the context (i.e. 4(a) and (b))
and the proposition 5 are processed together and not each
singly. When 5 has contextual implications 6 and 7 then
5 is said to be "relevant" in the context 4. Hence the
interpretation of a proposition in some context involves
the inference of contextual implications of the proposition
in the context (set of propositions) and the establishment
of the contextual implications in turn is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the "relevance" of the proposition
in the "context". Where there might be two or more possible
interpretations of one proposition in a context, the "choice"
of the appropriate interpretation involves the discovery of
the proposition which has "maximal" contextual implications
in that context.
The "principle of relevance" then is defined by
Sperber & ilson (1982:75) thus: The speaker tries to
express the proposition which is the most relevant one
possible to the hearer!' On these terms, the interpretation
of an utterance with several meanings in one context involves
the "choice" of the most relevant proposition in the
"context(s)". This proposition will also tend to have the
characteristic of being the most easily accessible (i.e.
of being processed with the maximum of ease). Both the
maximal relevance of a proposition in a context or contexts
and its minimum difficulty in processing contribute to the
-1 o.
choice of the appropriate interpretation of a vague,
ambiguous or indeterminate utterance. The Sperber &
Wilson framework then, however controversial it might be
(Cf. Gazdar and Good, 1982	 ),clearly indicates
how sDeakers and hearers might proceed to disambiguate or
assign the appropriate reference to a potentially vague
utterance for example. It is to an exploitation of this
framework for the interpretation of some of the issues
we noted in chapter five, that we must now turn.
6.2 Towards a pragmatic treatment of temporally vague
utterances
6.2.1 The imperfective paradox
We have seen that the essence of the imperfective
paradox as demonstrated by Dowty and others is that whereas
the entailment rule "X is/was V-.ing"	 4 "X has V-ed/V-ed"
applies for progressive "activity propositions" and that the
truth of such a "progressive proposition" entails the truth
of its "perfect or simple past" one, of which it is a part;
this interpretation does not necessarily apply to
"accomplishment or ac}-ievernent progressive propositions".
According to the standard principle of compositionality of
meaning we have therefore a paradox.
Another way of presenting the paradox in part, Is to
claim for example, that a past progressive accomplishment
or achievement proposition is vague or has two (or more)
possible interpretations which can only be decided if we
know the context(s) in which it appears. Utterance 8
for instance,
8. E: Wajabu was drawing a circle yesterday
#	 #.%\	 .	 .	 ,	 .	 ..	 \	 .Y: Cheajabu a-ambwile-je lindanda liso
_.• .'n\	 %	 •	 ..-	 .. 'C: v,a.jabu a-ma-jambla dzira dzulo
can be interpreted as either that the circle was completed
or not, according to the context. 8 could also be taken
to mean that Wajabu was going to draw a circle in some
time posterior to speech time. 4 Using the Sperber &
Wilson framework how might this sentence be assigned its
interpretation according to the context?
We will suppose first that the following is one of
the contexts in which 8 is to be interpreted:
9. Context1 : (a) We know that Wajabu intended to
draw a circLe
(b) We actually saw him drawing the
circle yesterday.
(c) He completed drawing the circle.
Context2 : (a) We know that Wajabu intended to
draw a circle.
(b) He started drawing the circle.
(c) But someone hit him on the head
and ilajabu fainted before he could
complete the circle.
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Supposing the two interpretations of 8 are in fact 10
and 11 below (i.e. 8 is vague between these two readings):
10. Wajabu has drawn/drew the circle.
11. Wajabu did not draw a circle; he only drew
part of it.
According to the framework we have adopted, to provide the
appropriate interpretation of 8 (i.e. the choice between
10 and ii), we must link 8 up logically to one of the
contexts (i.e. 9 C or 9C2 ) and decide on the basis of
logical inference, which of the two propositions 10 or 11
is deducible from the union of 8 in the context C 1 or C2.
On these terms, given the context 9 C1 , 8 will be
said to convey 10. And given 9 C2 , 8 will convey 11.
These are the contexts in which 8 is relevant or has the
most contextual implications. The "deductive device"
(Cf. Sperber & Wilson, ibid) employed to arrive at these
contextual implications will be less complicated in each
of the cases where one proposition is more relevant in
one context than another in the same context. That is
processing 8 in the context 9 C1 to arrive at 11 will be
impossible (i.e. going through a process of logical
inference). 5 This then is how the irnperfective paradox
might be resolved more elegantly pragmatically than
semantically.
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6.2.2 The gaps problem
Suppose we have the following context 12 C3:
12C3 . (a) A is sitting in the theatre.
(b) A's partner B, has gone to the toilet.
(c) It is break time but A and B are expected
to watch the whole show.
(d) There is an empty seat where B was sitting.
(e) C has come during this intermission into
the theatre.
Suppose that C walks to A and the following short exchange
ensues:
13. (1) C to A: Is anyone sitting here?
(ii) A to C: Yes.
We saw in the last chapter that there is a problem in the
interpretation of 13 (ii). It is truth-conditionally
indeteruiinate between the falsity of the proposition "at"
the interval of time when the question is posed (that is,
when the seat is clearly empty) and its truth "for" the
interval of time when A and B intended to watch the show
(that is, from beginning to finish). Clearly the inter-
pretation of 13 (ii) by C which might take the form of 14
14. The seat is taken (although no-one is sitting
on it right now).
is made after C has gone through a process of inference
of 14 from 13 (Ii) treated in the context 12 C 3 (which
he has to supply). Given the context 12 C3 , it is surely
inappropriate to assume that 13 (ii) contextually implicates
something other than 14. That is, in the context 12 C3
13 (ii) must be taken to mean 14.
Similarly, we can see how the hearer assigns the
appropriate interpretation to utterance 15:
S.	 S.	 .	 %	 .'	 %	 '	 -	 -
15. Y:	 Wju -sum1sye-,Je magalimoto nnungu wospe
-	 S.	 S. - S S. SC: Wjbi -rn-gulitsa magalimoto mlng w6ns
E: Wajabu was/has been selling cars the whole week
Given a context such as the following for example:
16 C4 . (a) We saw Wajabu putting up posters for the
sale of cars that week.
(b) There were ten cars which we know Wajabu
wanted to sell.
(c) But the cars were priced too high, a fact
which was pointed out by almost every
prospective buyer.
(d) After the week in which Wajabu set out to
sell the cars, there were still ten cars
unsold.
We can safely assume that 17 rather than 18 is the more
relevant proposition for the appropriate interpretation oi' 15.
-195-
17. Nobody bought a car from Wajabu that week.
18. Wajabu sold a few cars that week.
The hearer goes through the same process of finding
the maximally relevant contextual implication for the
interpretation of 15 in the context 16 C and discovers
that the contextual implication in 17 is the appropriate
interpretation of 15.
Clearly, if we changed the context to 19:
19 C5 . (a) We saw Wajabu putting up posters for
the sale of cars that week.
(b) There were ten cars which we know Wajabu
wanted to sell.
(c) Wajabu priced the cars rather high.
(d) Only two cars were sold.
(e) After the week set out to sell the cars,
there were eight cars unsold.
18 will be judged to be the more relevant proposition for
the interpretation of 15 in this new context 19 C 5. Given
two different contexts therefore and one proposition 15
which is relevant to both contexts, two different
contextual implications can be deduced for the appropriate
interpretation o± the proposition.
6.2.3 The simple past and perfect interpretation
In chapter four we argued that there is no
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ungramrnaticality or unacceptability in Yao and Chewa
induced by the co-occurrence of the perfect and adverbials
like yesterday, last year etc. We demonstrated that when
this happens the "perfect meaning" of the utterance is riot
lost. The utterance is therefore interpreted as if the
event described happened close to the speech time.
.. -20. Y: ChWjbi a-wile chaca chrchrrle'chi.
'	 %C:	 jbti wa-fa chaka chth'chi.
E: ?Wajabu has died only last year.
, ,\ '	 #	 h-1	 .21 • Y: CheWajabu a-wiie mwaches.
'	
.*.C: Wa'jb a-na-.a chk chth.
E: Wajabu died last year.
Now take the two utterances in 20 and 21. Given the
context in 22 C6,
22 C 6 (a) Wajabu died last year
(b) His death was too sudden to be easily
forgotten
(c) A and B are talking about Wajabu's death
(d) They both remember his death with freshness
(e) They are still concerned about the death
the union of the "perfect" proposition in 20 with 22 C6
might induce the contextual implication in 23:
23. Wajabu's death is described as If it has just
happened.
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Clearly 21 is not relevant to the context 22 C6 because
it is a matter-of-fact way of describing Wajabu's death.
For the appropriate interpretation of 21 a context like
21i. C7 might be needed.
24 C7 . (a) vlajabu died last year.
(b) A and 3 are talking about his death.
(c) They remember the death like any other
death.
(d) There is nothing that is different about
the death.
(e) They are riot particularly interested in
the death.
Given the context 24 C7 , the processing of 20 in this
context will definitely be a tough ,job to perform. It is
21 which is the more relevant proposition in the context
24. C7 ; it has more contextual implications in that context
and it will also be processed with the maximum of ease.
In other words, although truth-conditionally 20 and
21 are similar, their difference can easily be detected
when treated in such contexts as 22 C 6 or 24 C7 . And the
fact that the perfect form of the Yao and Cbea utterances
co-occurs easily with temporal adverbials like "last year"
which denote time more removed from the speech time of the
utterance hereas in English this situation does not hold,
-198-
only shows that such temporal adverbials can be used in
Yao and Chea to describe the "theoretical" closeness
of the event to the speech time of the utterance when in
English this does not happen.6
6.2.4 The interpretation of future tim-e
We noted in chapter four that the treatment of tense
according to the Reichenbachian framework has been said to
be inadequate in several respects. Wachtel (1982: 336)
notes five instances where this model appears to fail
to account for the appropriate Interpretation of utterances.
The Issue concerns the interpretation of utterances such
as those in 25 and 26 below:
25. E: John comes home tomorrow
Y Ch'''	 '	 ''Joni a-kwisa kumusi malac-i
C: J6n1 -ki-f^k kixndzi mwà
26. E: John will come home tomorrow
\Y: Ch(J6nh tLchr-ik kimsi maiawl
C: J6n1 -dz-f^k kmdzI rnaw
TruthconditiOnallY, these sentences are similar: they
refer to the future time in which the event is expected to
take place. Dowty (1979) sees their difference lying in
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in the notion of "inertia worlds" which he introduces
(Cf. the last chapter).Smith C.S.(1981, 1982) setheir
difference lying in aspect. It is important to note in
fact, that both Dow-bj and Smith C.S. are generally concerned
about the interpretation of three utterances all of which
refer to the future time. The third one is the so-called
'Progressive futurate" in 27:
27. E; John is coming borne tomorrow
	
, ,. '
	
.- , ,
	 S	 VY: CheJoni a-kwisa kuniusi mala
	
'	 .-. .- ' \
	 \C: Joni a-ku-fika kumudzi maw
The truth conditions that Dowty and Smith CUS. provide
then (for the interpretation of 25 and 26 on the one hand
and 27 on the other ) could also be reflected within the
Reichenbachian framework by indicating that 27 has
progressive aspect and 25 and 26 are neutral to such
interpretation. But both the truth-conditional treatment
and the Reichenbachian one fail to indicate the difference
between 25 and 26.
According to Reichenbach (1947) both 25 and 26 have
the structure S - R , E • That is, the "planning,"
"scheduling" or "structuring" of the event apparently
assumed by Huddleston (1969); GoldsmIth & Woisetschlaeger
(1982) and others for 25 and its neutrality for 26 are
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not accounted for by the Reichenbachian framework.
We suggest that the difference between 25 and 26
(or even lack of it), might be discovered during the
interpretation of the utterances in a context. But we
would have to provide a very subtle context indeed,
in order to see the difference. If we set up a context
such as 28 C8 for example,
28 C8 • (a) We know that John is expected tomorrow
(b) People at home have made preparations
for his arrival.
(c) We know he has bought the air ticket
(d) The flight has not been cancelled
(e) John's papers are in order.
we suspect that both 25 and 26 might have similar contextual
implications and therefore should be equally relevant in
the context 28 C8 . Ideally, if the claim that 25 indicates
the scheduling of the event (or John's coming home), then
29 should be the relevant contextual implication of 25 in
the context 28 C8.
29. It is relatively certain that John will be
home tomorrow.
But common sense tells us that this could easily be
the contextual implication for 26 as well processed in the
2O1-
context 28 C8 . In other words, although this appears to be
one of those cases where the principle of relevance seems
to fail to apply, we should probably take this as a challenge
to cause us to find subtler contextual implications in order
to discover the difference which is claimed to exist in
the utterances in question. On these terms, we might even
use the principle of relevance to disprove certain so-called
semantic problems. The fault may not be with the pragmatic
framework, but with the type of semantics we adopt.
6.3 Conclusions
What we intended to do in this chapter is indicate
that now that pragmatics is developing as an utterance-
interpretation discipline, we can be more specific about
what we mean whenwe say that certain vague utterances
can best be interpreted "in context". The Sperber &
Wilson framework which we have in part exploited here
(however inadequately), does at least indicate how the
te cholceiP of the appropriate interpretation amongst several
possible ones in a context(which is more clearly defined),
is not in fact arbitrarily made. Given the notion of "context"
as provided, and of contextual implications deducible from
the union of the indeterminate utterance and the context,
we can easily show how the principle of relevance operates
during utterance-interpretation.
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6.4 General Conclusion
This thesis has demonstrated that the inter -
pretation of utterances generally depends on morpho-
syntactic and semantic factors; but that in addition to
such grammatical parameters, it is also imperative
to take cognisance of pragmatic factors too. The
Sperber & WilSon theory of pragmatics finally makes
it possible to start fleshing out the syntactic skeleton
with some rigour.
- 03--
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER SIX
1.	 In this respect even the influence of social
context in utterance interpretation advocated recently
by fore & Licflermott (1982) is more relevant to our task
here than Green's statement. fore & McDermott (p.396)
conclude, "I-t is true that conversationalists hear
quite extraordinary statements (e.g. paradoxes) in
quite ordinary ways; at the same time, ordinary statements
can be heard in quite extraordinary ways ...".
2. What follows is a summary of the recent work on
pragmatics by Sperber & Wilson. Most of the summary is
in fact a copy of their phraseology. I am deeply indebted
to them for letting me use their work so freely.Any
inappropriate application of their theory is, of course,
my own fault.
3. See Smith N. y . (1981) for the first use of this
principle in the interpretation of tense, which we amplify
in this chapter.
4. Note that this utterance can be interpreted
pragmatically as we might interpret 62 in chapter three,
i.e. the solution being provided for the interpretation
of this sentence also applies for the interpretation
of sentence 62 in chapter three.
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5. We will not bother to indicate the system of
inference adopted by Sperber & Wilson here. We suggest
that readers refer to their work where the "deductive
device" is indicated. Generally, it is no different
from any other logical device of inference, which
readers might be aware of.
6. Obviously where two utterances of different
morphological structure have similar contextual implications
in similar contexts, this framework will fail to handle
the situation, unless there are clear differences of
length and complexity which will make one more easily
processable than the other.
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